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The UK Strategic Defence and Security Review (2015), places ‘cyber’ in the 
highest category tier-one risk. The threats from cyberspace is ever increasing 
as UK Armed Forces is becoming increasingly dependent on its’ information 
systems and networks for daily business processes. Hardware and software 
technological defences are effective tools to protect our systems and networks, 
nonetheless these defences are useless if humans operators allows attackers 
to maliciously exploit our systems through use of social engineering techniques. 
There is currently no measurement framework in the R SIGNALS or the Army to 
assess basic cyber awareness and behaviour of soldiers and officers and 
benchmarking user cyber awareness maturity state.  
In this study, the author creates an innovative measurement framework that is 
utilised to measure cyber security awareness and behaviour in the R SIGNALS. 
The framework is an extension and adaptation of the government NCSC 
infographics for basic cyber security protective practices which in this study is 
split into five themes for measuring awareness (device safety, device backup, 
phishing, password and malware) and one theme for behaviour. The research 
adopts a quantitative positivist approach with using a questionnaire to measure 
human cyber awareness and behaviour. Study of human psychology models in 
the literature indicates that factors such as awareness and subsequent attitudes 
have direct influences on human behaviour. Results after codification and 
statistical analysis confirmed that technical trades in the R SIGNALS has better 
awareness of device safety, malware and phishing while cyber training was 
directly related to user behaviour and awareness of device safety. Overall user 
awareness in the R SIGNALS was found to be at Integrated level out of the five 
levels in the Community Cyber Security Maturity Model. 
The measurement framework is not limited to application to R SIGNALS and 
has the utility for other corps and organisations within the Army. Key future 
research recommendations included adding an attitude scale to the framework 
and having the correct sample to represent population variation. 
ii 
 
Keywords: cyber security awareness, information security awareness, human 
and cyber, cyber behaviour, cyber training, cyber hygiene, cyber  awareness 






Firstly, I would like to express my heartfelt thanks to my dissertation supervisor 
Dr Victoria Smy for her undivided support and her patience with me during this 
study. Without her invaluable support, this study would not have been 
successful. 
I would like to convey my thanks to all the R SIGNALS soldiers and officers who 
took part in the survey. 
Finally, I would also like to thank all those individuals who have directly or 
indirectly contributed to this study.  
  
iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ......................................................................................................... i 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS................................................................................... iii 
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................. vi 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................. viii 
LIST OF EQUATIONS ........................................................................................ ix 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................ x 
1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 2 
1.1 Research Overview ................................................................................... 4 
1.2 Research Context ..................................................................................... 5 
1.2.1 Research Rationale ............................................................................ 5 
1.2.2 Research Aim and Objectives ............................................................ 6 
1.3 Thesis Structure ........................................................................................ 7 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................... 9 
2.1.1 Literature Review Overview ............................................................... 9 
2.1.2 Research Search Strategy ................................................................. 9 
2.1.3 Literature Review Themes ............................................................... 10 
2.1.4 What is Cyber Security? ................................................................... 11 
2.1.5 The Human Factor ........................................................................... 15 
2.1.6 Cyber Security Awareness Measurement Frameworks.................... 25 
2.1.7 Common and Proven Cyber Awareness Delivery Methods .............. 29 
2.1.8 Cyber Security Capability Maturity Model ......................................... 31 
2.1.9 Measures and Metrics of Cyber Security Capability Maturity ........... 33 
2.1.10 UK and Defence Cyber Security Strategy ...................................... 35 
2.1.11 Research Context – The Royal Corps of Signals ........................... 37 
2.2 Summary ................................................................................................ 39 
3 METHODOLOGY .......................................................................................... 40 
3.1 Research Philosophy .............................................................................. 40 
3.2 Participants ............................................................................................. 44 
3.2.1 Sampling Strategy ............................................................................ 44 
3.2.2 Sample Selection ............................................................................. 48 
3.2.3 Design and Materials ........................................................................ 49 
3.2.4 Questionnaire Design ....................................................................... 49 
3.2.5 Pilot Survey ...................................................................................... 53 
3.2.6 Procedure ......................................................................................... 54 
3.2.7 Ethics ............................................................................................... 54 
4 RESULTS ...................................................................................................... 55 
4.1 Quantitative Data Treatment ................................................................... 56 
4.1.1 Cronbach’s Reliability of (Sub)Scales .............................................. 57 
4.2 Descriptive Results ................................................................................. 58 
v 
4.2.1 Sample Characteristics .................................................................... 58 
4.2.2 Pearson’s Correlation ....................................................................... 62 
4.2.3 Research Question Specific Correlations ......................................... 65 
4.3 Statistical Analysis .................................................................................. 65 
4.3.1 Independent Sample t-test ............................................................... 65 
4.3.2 One-Way Anova Test ....................................................................... 66 
4.4 Cyber Capability Maturity for R SIGNALS ............................................... 68 
5 DISCUSSION ................................................................................................ 71 
5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................. 71 
5.2 Research Questions and Objectives ....................................................... 71 
5.2.1 Research Question 1 (RQ1) ............................................................. 72 
5.2.2 Research Question 2 (RQ2) ............................................................. 81 
5.3 Research Generalisation ........................................................................ 84 
5.4 Organisational Recommendations .......................................................... 84 
5.4.1 Recommendations – Quick Wins ..................................................... 85 
5.4.2 Recommendations – Medium Term ................................................. 86 
5.5 Methodological Evaluation ...................................................................... 87 
5.5.1 Methodology Limitations and Constraints ......................................... 87 
5.6 Future Research ..................................................................................... 90 
5.7 Summary ................................................................................................ 92 
6 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 93 
6.1 Research Outcomes ............................................................................... 93 
6.1.1 Research Question 1 (RQ1) ............................................................. 93 
6.1.2 Research Question 2 (RQ 2) ............................................................ 95 
6.1.3 Literature Consideration ................................................................... 96 
6.1.4 Final Thoughts ................................................................................. 97 
REFERENCES ................................................................................................. 99 
APPENDICES ................................................................................................ 112 
Appendix A – Literature Use for Research.................................................. 112 
Appendix B – Survey Questionnaire ........................................................... 115 
Appendix C – Ethical Approval Email ......................................................... 126 
Appendix D – R SIGNALS Placement in Community Cyber Capability 





LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1 - NSRA 2015 Priority Risks (HM Govt, 2015, p.87) .............................. 2 
Figure 2 - Six Layers of Cyberspace (MOD Cyber Primer, 2016, p5) ............... 17 
Figure 3 - Theory of Planned Behaviour (Adapted from Hoeksma, Gerritzen, 
Lokhorst et al. 2017,p.17) .......................................................................... 19 
Figure 4 - Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs (Arnold et al., 2005, p313) ................ 21 
Figure 5 -NCSC Cyber Security for Small Businesses (NCSC, 2017) .............. 26 
Figure 6 - Focus Areas for ISA (Wahyudiwan, Suchayo and Gandhi, 2017, 
p.655) ........................................................................................................ 27 
Figure 7 - Humphreys Capability Maturity Levels (1989, cited in Hoang and Le, 
2007, p.4)) ................................................................................................. 32 
Figure 8 - Cyber CMM Model for US Electricity Sector (Curtisand Mehravari, 
2015, p.4) .................................................................................................. 33 
Figure 9 - Community Cyber Security Maturity Model (White, 2011, p175) ...... 34 
Figure 10 - Cyber Capability Maturity Model (Barclay, 2014, p.7) .................... 35 
Figure 11 - Research Onion (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009) ................ 41 
Figure 12 - A Philosophical Framework for Thought and Practice (Lynham and 
Ruona, 2014, p155) ................................................................................... 42 
Figure 13 - Population, Sample and Individual cases (Saunders et al., 2009, 
p211) ......................................................................................................... 45 
Figure 14 - Calculating Minimum Sample Size (Saunders et al., 2009, p581) . 47 
Figure 15 - Adjusted Minimum Sample Size (Saunders et al., 2009, p582) ..... 47 
Figure 16 - Example Likert Scale on Agreement .............................................. 50 
Figure 17 - Sample Age Group ......................................................................... 59 
Figure 18 - Sample Breakdown of Ranks ......................................................... 60 
Figure 19 - Length of Time Served of Participants ........................................... 60 
Figure 20 - Trade Breakdown of Participants ................................................... 61 
Figure 21 - Cyber Training Breakdown ............................................................. 61 
Figure 22 - Participants Education Level .......................................................... 62 
Figure 23 - Breakdown for Different Maturity Levels ........................................ 69 






LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1 - Big Five Personality Traits (Adapted from Heinek and Anger, 2010, 
p536) ......................................................................................................... 22 
Table 2 - Demographics Vs Phishing Susceptibility (Aloul et al., 2013, p5) ..... 24 
Table 3 - Initial Questions Design using 4 Likert Scale Types .......................... 52 
Table 4 -Question Design with 2 Likert Scale Types ........................................ 52 
Table 5 - Reliability Criteria using SPSS Software (SPSS, 2018) .................... 57 
Table 6 - Cronbach's Alpha Results ................................................................. 58 
Table 7 - Pearson's Intercorrelation.................................................................. 63 
Table 8 - Independent Test Results (Cyber Training Vs All attitudes) .............. 66 
Table 9 - One Sample t-test Results ................................................................ 68 
Table 10 - Cyber Maturity Model Levels (White, 2011) .................................... 69 





LIST OF EQUATIONS 







LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
A2020R Army 2020 Refine 
ALARP As low as reasonably practicable 
APC Army Personnel Centre 
CCSCMM Community Cyber Security Capability Maturity Model 
CMM Capability Maturity Model 
CPT Cyber Protection Team 
CURES Cranfield University Research Ethics System 
DE Officer Direct Entry Officer 
DoS Denail of Service 
ENISA European Union Agency for Network and Information 
Security 
FofS Foreman of Signals 
HAIS Human Aspect of Information Security 
HM Govt Her Majesty’s Government 
ICT Information Communication Technology 
ICM Information Capability Management 
ILO Intended Learning Objectives 
IS  Information Systems 
ISA Information Security Awareness 
ISO International Security Standard 
IT Information Technology 
JPA Joint Personal Administration 
KAB Knowledge, Attitude and Behaviour 
xi 
LE Officer Late Entry Officer 
MOD Ministry of Defence 
NCSC National Cyber Security Centre 
NICE National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education 
NSRA National Security Risk Assessment 
R SIGNALS Royal Corps of Signals 
RAF Royal Air Force 
RD Regimental Duties 
RQ Research Question 
RN Royal Navy 
SDSR Strategic Defence and Security Review 
SPSS Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
Tfc Offr Traffic Officer 
TPB Theory of Planned Behaviour 
TRA Theory of Reasoned action 
TAM Technology Acceptance Model 
Trg Training 
TOT Technical Officer Telecommunications 
UK United Kingdom 







1 INTRODUCTION  
In the world that we live in today Information Technology (IT) is ubiquitous and 
there is greater risk to cyberspace than ever before as access to computer and 
networks have become more prevalent and organisations have become more 
dependent on the information systems that is used to carry out daily business 
processes. Because of these risks organisations employ cyber security 
strategies and policies which defines protective security practices that should be 
applied to prevent or reduce the likelihood of cyber-attacks.  
“Cyber Security of any organisation can only be as strong as its 
weakest link. The biggest vulnerabilities of a system are not 
necessarily found in hardware or software, but rather with the 
people who use it” (Wright, 2016). 
The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 
(SDSR) (HM Government, 2015) highlights that ‘Cyber’ is one of the tier one 
risks (shown in Figure 1) which is the highest priority risk for national security 
over the next five years and remains a priority for Ministry of Defence (MOD).  
 
Figure 1 - NSRA 2015 Priority Risks (HM Govt, 2015, p.87) 
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Due to the likelihood and impact of risks posed from cyberspace and the priority 
placed on it, the UK government (2015) announced that £1.9 billion would be 
spent for the following five years on UK’s cyber security. A portion of the budget 
will be allocated to the Armed Forces to improve the cyber defences and cyber 
security programmes. Effective cyber security programmes in the military will 
need mechanisms for enhancing basic user security awareness and adoption of 
safe computing behaviour.  
 
In the UK National Cyber Security Strategy defines ‘cyber security’ as: 
 
 “The protection of information (hardware, software and associated 
infrastructure), the data on them, and the services they provide 
from unauthorised access, harm or misuse. This includes harm 
caused intentionally by the operator of a system, or accidentally, 
as a result of failing to follow security procedures” (HM 
Government, 2016, p15). 
 
To avoid becoming susceptible to cyber-attack, it is imperative that cyber 
security strategy and policies within it are understood and cyber security 
awareness is widespread amongst employees within an organisation that 
interacts with the cyberspace whether at home or at work. Employees should 
also be able to adopt protective cyber security practices to prevent becoming 
victim of organised cyber criminals. The MOD Cyber Primer doctrine mentions 
the importance of cyber awareness, education, individual and collective training 
exercises and an understanding of risk management in the cyberspace (HM 
Govt, MOD, 2016). Although, the doctrine mentions about the MOD cyber good 
practice guide, there is currently no cyber strategy document for the Army unlike 
the Royal Air Force (RAF) which was published in 2014. In the Army 
Information Sub-Strategy paper (General Semple, 2015) written by the 
Directorate Information, Army Headquarters it is mentioned that ‘cyber’ has not 
yet been embraced by the Army and is a priority area of modernisation to 
achieve success in the information age. Whether back in base or in a deployed 
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environment, R SIGNALS units and employees are responsible for providing 
and maintaining communication infrastructure, networks, systems and services 
to the wider Army, hence makes it prone to cyber-attack if robust cyber security 
strategy is not implemented and soldiers and officers are not well acquainted 
with cyber protection measures. 
Due to the technical nature of R SIGNALS, the corps becomes a key point of 
focus when searching pathways to aid the Army ‘embrace’ cyber. Under Army 
2020 Refine (A2020R), R SIGNALS is restructuring with added focus in the field 
of cyber in addition to providing IS, networks and services (R SIGNALSa, 2017). 
This means there is greater importance for soldiers and officers to be aware of 
basic cyber security protective practices. While there are policies and doctrines 
to aid cyber security at high level, there is a need to assess user awareness of 
basic cyber protective practices and to examine they exhibit safe and secure 
cyber behaviour. There is currently no measurement framework in the R 
SIGNALS or the Army for testing basic user cyber awareness and behaviour. In 
this research, the author will develop an innovative and novel measurement 
framework in the form of a questionnaire to assess cyber security awareness 
and behaviour in the novel context of R SIGNALS. The measurement results 
can then be extrapolated to benchmark user cyber security awareness level 
using existing cyber security maturity models found in literature. This framework 
will not be limited to R SIGNALS and the benefits can be realised by other corps 
within the Army or other services.  
1.1 Research Overview 
Cyber security is key to protect our infrastructure, systems, networks and 
services. Understanding the threats and vulnerabilities to our systems and 
networks is key to developing a strategy that reduces the risk of an attack. Due 
to rapid technological advances, cyber security tends to be challenging and 
difficult to maintain as hackers find more sophisticated form of attacks to 
infiltrate our networks to gain valuable information or inflict damage. There are 
numerous online cyber security awareness initiatives and campaigns led by the 
UK Govt which defines safe practices but these are useless unless the user 
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communities are aware of it and in compliance. There is also an issue with 
whether users have the right attitude and behaviour to follow the safe practices 
despite being aware of it. Hence, it is equally important to understand the 
motivational aspects of cyber behaviour and what influences users to adopt 
cyber security protection measures. The Army currently do not have a cyber 
security strategy and, although Cyber Protection Teams (CPTs) recently have 
formed which comprises of cyber professionals, there is no empirical evidence 
on the level of awareness amongst normal users. There are numerous 
academic research outputs that show that technological defences and cyber 
professionals alone cannot provide full cyber security. This research will look at 
cyber security awareness and human behavioural models and explore what 
influences users’ cyber behaviour. 
1.2 Research Context 
To fulfil the overall aim of the disseration the research will consider the following 
two research questions: 
Research Question 1 (RQ1) – How can cyber security awareness be 
measured? Can an explicit framework for cyber awareness be constructed to 
inform measurement of cyber security awareness? 
Research Question 2 (RQ2) – Can measurements be used to form an 
assessment of cyber awareness capability maturity?  
1.2.1 Research Rationale 
Cyber security awareness and the application of security practices are crucial to 
deter adversaries from gaining access to our networks and systems. The MOD 
has a cyber strategy which should be used to develop strategies for the three 
services (Army, Navy, Air Force). The Army currently do not have a cyber 
strategy hence it is difficult to interpret what cyber practices should be employed 
at ground level by the user communities. It is important to understand what 
cyber situational awareness means and what basic practices ought to be used 
by normal users.  This research will help understand the level of cyber security 
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awareness amongst soldiers and officers in the R SIGNALS. It will further 
examine cyber behaviour by use of behavioural models to understand what 
motivates employees to adopt cyber practices and preventative cyber security 
measures. The key responsibility of R SIGNALS units and personnel are to 
provide networks, systems and services in barracks and in a deployed 
environment in operations. As soldiers and officers have access to the 
cyberspace through the network and systems, it is important for them to 
understand the risks and vulnerabilities of cyber intrusions by the adversaries 
and have awareness of basic cyber security practices.   
This thesis study will aim to fulfil the dissertation module aims and Intended 
Learning Outcomes (ILOs) for Information Capability Management (ICM). The 
study will be closely aligned to Cyber Security module of Information Capability 
Management (ICM). The thesis study will conduct an investigative study of 
cyber security awareness and the application of safe cyber security practices in 
R SIGNALS organisation in terms of producing recommendations for cyber 
training in the future. The study includes critical evaluation and integration of 
published research studies that are applicable to cyber security awareness and 
cyber behavioural models. Evaluation and analysis of behavioural models and 
cyber capability maturity models will be carried out to produce cyber awareness 
training recommendations and benchmarking cyber security awareness for 
soldiers and officers in the R SIGNALS.   
1.2.2 Research Aim and Objectives 
The aim of this research is to study the human perspectives of cyber security 
capability in defence settings. This research will look at cyber security 
awareness and cyber behaviours amongst soldiers and officers in the R 
SIGNALS to provide recommendations on future cyber security training. Along 
with answering the research questions set out above, objectives of the study will 
entail: 
a.  Study of cyber security awareness and behaviour amongst soldiers and 
officers in the R SIGNALS. 
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b.  Understand UK and Defence cyber security strategy and how it applies to 
the Army. 
c.  Study of cyber behaviour through use of behavioural models and factors that 
influences cyber behaviour. 
d.  By use of government infographics on cyber security for small businesses 
understand cyber security awareness and protective practices adopted in the R 
SIGNALS and how best to deliver them. 
e.  Find a suitable capability maturity model to analyse and benchmark cyber 
security capability maturity in R SIGNALS. 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
The report will include six chapters and will comprise of Introduction, Literature 
Review, Research Methodology, Results, Discussion and Conclusion. 
Chapter 1 – Introduction: This chapter will provide an overview of the 
research area and describe how the research will benefit R SIGNALS. It will 
also explain the research rationale and highlight the research questions to 
achieve the aim of the dissertation. Furthermore, the chapter will outline the aim 
and objectives of the research. 
Chapter 2 – Literature Review: This chapter will include critical appraisal of 
research literature from multiple sources. The research literature will examine 
background factors and demographics which may have an effect to cyber 
security awareness. It will also investigate the human aspects of cyber in 
general which could lead to or influence cyber security behaviour. Furthermore, 
the research will investigate the most promising cyber security awareness 
measurement models and aim to overlap with the government infographic on 
cyber security for small businesses. Finally, a detailed study of cyber security 
capability maturity models is going to be carried out to benchmark cyber 
awareness state in the R SIGNALS. 
Chapter 3 – Research Methodology 
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Chapter 3 will look at various research methodologies and adopt the most 
suitable research philosophy to address the research questions. The research 
methodology used will be most closely aligned with the ‘positivist’ philosophical 
approach. This method will be objective and will collect quantitative data from 
soldiers and officers through an online survey questionnaire designed using 
Qualtrics.  
Chapter 4 – Results 
This chapter will look at the results from the data collected from soldiers and 
officers in the R SIGNALS using the questionnaire. It will also interpret the 
results returned from the critical literature review and justify the use of cyber 
security awareness measurement framework in this research.  
Chapter 5 – Discussion 
This chapter will look at the results returned from the hypothesis tested for the 
research. It will discuss results obtained from the survey and literature review 
and analyse the research questions in detail. Evaluation of the methodology 
used for the research will be conducted with comments on strengths and 
weaknesses of the methods used. Furthermore, recommendations will be made 
for future research. 
6 – Conclusions  
This chapter will highlight the conclusions drawn from this research and present 
a summary of findings about the research and cyber security awareness and 
behaviour of soldiers and officers in R SIGNALS. It will also include summary of 








2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1.1 Literature Review Overview  
In this chapter a critical review of literature will be conducted and relevant 
research literature from multiple sources will be rigorously evaluated to inform 
the dissertation aim and objectives. The literature review will include research 
on cyber security awareness, and more importantly, measurement frameworks 
available to measure cyber awareness. This approach will be adopted to 
explore the linkage between the practitioner (industry/defence) and academic 
domain with respect to cyber security awareness. In addition to this, aspects of 
human behaviours in cyber security will be investigated to find the factors which 
influences cyber security awareness in general. A detailed study of cyber 
awareness frameworks and cyber security maturity models will be carried out to 
measure cyber awareness and benchmark cyber awareness maturity state in 
the R SIGNALS. 
2.1.2 Research Search Strategy 
“For most research questions and objectives, you will have a good idea of which 
subject matter is going to be relevant. You will, however, be less clear about the 
parameters within which you need to search” (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 
2009, p75). For this research an effective search strategy was applied to gain 
access to high quality and relevant information from the electronic databases 
available. Given the aims and timescales of research at master’s level a 
bounded literature review was conducted on cyber situational awareness, cyber 
behaviour, cyber security measurement frameworks and cyber security maturity 
models. Keywords such as ‘Cyber’ and ‘Cyberspace’ were considered too broad 
for the research topic and were considered out of scope of the aims and 
objectives of the present research. Abstract reviews was used to determine the 
right literature fo the thesis using electronic sources available through Cranfield 
University login credentials.  
A detailed search strategy was devised and run through the electronic 
databases; Cranfield University Barrington Library, IEEEXplore, Google 
 
10 
Scholar, Scopus, Science Direct, ACM, Emerald, SpringerLink etc available 
through the Cranfield University website. Keywords such as ‘Cyber Security’, 
‘Cyber Awareness’, ‘Cyber Awareness Measurements’, ‘Information Security 
Awareness’, ‘Cyber Security Capability Maturity Models’’, ‘Cyber Hygiene’ and 
‘Cyber Behaviour’ were used in the electronic databases to find the research 
material. The results presented from the databases when using the keywords 
were then filtered by checking whether the search terms were included in the 
title, keywords or abstract. In addition to this, several past Cranfield University 
dissertations which were available through the Barrington Library portal were 
reviewed. Academic articles and journals were filtered to provide results 
between 2000 – 2018 and an inclusion criteria of peer-reviewed was set. 
Furthermore, MOD Intranet was used to find military doctrines and articles 
which would inform how the military respond to Cyber Security.  
The resulting literature returned from the online databases were then grouped 
together into several themes for the author to review distinct aspects of cyber 
security awareness. This also helped the author to coherently separate areas of 
literature into different themes and link it to the research questions. Outputs 
from the literature are presented in the sections that follow. 
2.1.3 Literature Review Themes 
The materials returned from the literature review has been outlined into a 
number of themes. This was to allow the author to demonstrate a good 
understanding of the research area and ensure every aspect of cyber 
awareness is captured to inform the research questions. 
Literature search was conducted using keywords on online databases and 
results filtered after reading the abstract and title of the documents. The core 
areas of the thesis were then identified and grouped into several themes. The 
eight themes identified are as follows: 
1. Cyber Security 
2. Threat from Cyberspace 
 
11 
3. Cyber Security Awareness 
4. Factors affecting Cyber Awareness 
5. The Human Factor 
6. Cyber Awareness Measurement Frameworks 
7. Cyber Security Maturity Models 
8. MOD Doctrine 
Appendix A includes academic, white and grey literature that was used for this 
research. 
2.1.4 What is Cyber Security? 
“Cyber Security refers generally to the ability to control access to 
networked systems and information they contain. Where cyber 
security controls are effective, cyberspace is considered a reliable, 
resilient, and trustworthy digital infrastructure” (Bayuk et al., 2012, 
p1).  
The world is interconnected with internet of things which comprises of devices 
and networks that are capable of exchanging information. Whilst the benefits of 
a connected world are realised via the human kind, it is also important to 
understand and be aware of what risks and vulnerabilities exists by a globally 
connected world. This means that we need to be conversant with the protective 
measures that needs to be applied to reduce the probability of a cyber-attack 
from malicious users. Cyber security is protecting our networks, information 
systems and devices that are connected in the cyberspace. The Defence Cyber 
Primer (2016) describes the importance of Cyber Security for MOD as follows: 
“Cyber security is also vital to Defence as our Armed Forces 
depend on information and communication systems, both in the 
UK and on operations around the world. Our adversaries’ 
activities present a real and rapidly developing threat to these 
systems” (HM Government, MOD, 2016, p.1). 
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The 2016 National Cyber Strategy aim to invest £1.9 billion to protect the UK’s 
systems and infrastructure and to counter the threats from cyberspace. The 
budget will be invested into three different areas; defend against attack, deter 
hostile cyber actions from adversaries and develop cyber innovation. The 
investment will not only look at protecting public and private sector, big 
companies and industries but also look at investing in people to ensure 
development of a whole society capability for the UK. For the MOD, this 
investment is crucial as all sectors of defence are dependent on its critical 
networks, systems and information which in one way or another are connected 
to the wider digital space. Organisations must have a good understanding about 
the risks and vulnerabilities that is prevalent by connecting to this digital space 
know as the ‘cyberspace’. 
2.1.4.1 The Threat from Cyberspace 
 
The MOD SDSR (2015) identifies ‘Cyber’ as the fifth domain of warfare. 
Traditionally, warfare was limited to four domains; land, sea, air and space but 
as the information age evolved and the geopolitical landscape progressed into 
an internet of things the threat from cyberspace has become more prominent. 
“The information age is interconnected use of electronics, which moves digitised 
data through the electromagnetic spectrum, and has brought forth a fifth 
domain.” (Crowell, 2010, p.2)). 
President Obama stated that cyber threat would cause serious economic and 
national security challenge for America and added that the country’s prosperity 
would depend on cyber security (White House, 2009). The ever-increasing 
dependence on our Information Communication Technology (ICT) in military 
operations has meant our systems, network, data and people are vulnerable 
from the threat that cyberspace exposes. It is important that the armed forces 
counter these threats to allow freedom on manoeuvre in the battlespace and 
have the technological and operational advantage against the adversaries.  
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There are numerous examples of cyberattack which can be in the form of a 
malware planted within a target system to steal information or to disable and 
encrypt the system holding it to ransom. Alternatively, it may be in the form of a 
phishing email that is intended to fool the victim in offering in personal 
information. Recent attacks include Russian aggression against Estonia through 
a Denial of Service (DoS) in 2007 which disabled a number of key 
infrastructures (BBC News, 2008a) and crashed servers running websites for 
state government, political parties and leading newspapers. Another example is 
the hacking of the Yahoo email system in 2013 where one billion accounts were 
affected and resulted in stolen passwords and account details (The Guardian, 
2016). In 2017, NBC news (Johnson, 2017) reported a phishing attack on Gmail 
users using a worm posing as an email which affected roughly a billion users 
worldwide. It is of paramount importance that cyber security measures are in 
place and ICT infrastructure improved to counter these type of threats that is 
posed by cyberspace. The next section will look at what ‘cyber security 
awareness’ is and the importance it has for defending against social 
engineering exploitation of computer users. 
2.1.4.2 Cyber Security Awareness 
 
While organisations invest in their cyber security professionals, it is equally 
important that cyber awareness amongst normal users are also addressed as 
lack of cyber security awareness can be exploited by cyber criminals (as 
indicated in the Google attack). “Operating systems and programmes are more 
protected these days and attackers have shifted their attention to human 
elements to break into the organisation’s IS” (Abawajy, 2014, p237). As 
technological defences are getting stronger, cyber criminals are using social 
engineering techniques to target human weaknesses. User carelessness and 
lack of awareness can lead to system security breaches. Therefore, there is a 
need to address the cyber security awareness to protect the IT systems and 
networks. Rouse (2006, cited in Bullée et al., 2015, p98) mentions that as 
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organisations become increasingly dependent on their ICT, social engineering 
will become the greatest threat in the cyberspace. 
Choo (2011) classifies cyber-attacks into ‘syntactic, ‘semantic’ or a combination 
of both called the ‘blended attack’. Syntactic attack is carried out exploiting the 
technical vulnerabilities in software and hardware, whereas semantic attack is 
carried out using social engineering techniques exploiting human weaknesses. 
Brynielsson and Frank (2014) argues that although nations have adopted their 
cyber strategies, they are not always in agreement but priorities remain 
common in the need to protect critical national infrastructure and improve cyber 
awareness. It is important that these cyber strategic documents are translated 
into cyber policies and practices that are easy to understand and apply within 
organisations that employs IT systems that extend to the wider cyberspace. 
Cyber security situational awareness not only includes understanding the threat 
posed from a technical viewpoint but also from a human perspective to interpret 
the signs of malicious activities. Cyber security knowledge and awareness is 
essential to identify and take preventative measures if exposed to an attack 
from malicious users. Abawajy (2014) in his research on cyber awareness 
programme delivery method mentions ISA is the understanding from users 
about the importance of information security protective practices. Users should 
adopt these practices with good cyber hygiene. 
2.1.4.3 What is Cyber Hygiene? 
 
Protecting our network and IS connected to the cyberspace requires good cyber 
hygiene of doing the right thing, putting into place safe practices and exhibiting 
good cyber behaviour. The European Union Agency for Network and 
Information Security (ENISA, 2016) mentions cyber hygiene should be 
incorporated into organisation’s daily routine and should be maintained regularly 
like personal health to keep it in a good condition and to minimise risks from 
cyber threats. It further states that good cyber hygiene is essential for protecting 
data, networks and infrastructure for businesses and organisations against 




Crannell, Moulton and Sheppard (2013) in their study comes with a concept of 
‘Cyber first AID’ with AID standing for adaptable, integrated and deliberate. The 
approach is aimed at putting a cyber-attack response plan in place which can 
be adapted to deal with any form of attack. The plan should be fully integrated 
in the organisation’s routine and is deliberate in the form that everyone is aware 
of their role and the plan is regularly practiced. 
2.1.4.4 Factors affecting Cyber Security Awareness 
 
Barford, Dretterrich and Fredrikson (2010) highlights the seven aspects of cyber 
situational awareness as being aware of the present situation, awareness of the 
damage an attack can have, awareness of how situation unfolds, being aware 
of behaviour of malicious users, awareness how the situation is caused, being 
aware of the quality of the collected situation awareness information and 
predicting possible futures. It is important that cyber security awareness is 
addressed to reduce the risks posed by the adversaries from cyberspace and 
that countermeasures are put into place against the likelihood of an attack. To 
improve cyber security awareness in an organisation, technology defences 
alone are not enough to mitigate against risks posed by the cyber space. There 
are other factors that need to be considered such as cyber security policies, 
training, culture etc., but the most critical component is the human factor 
(Colwill, 2009). Organisations invest in technologies and train cyber 
practitioners to protect their networks and systems but often fail to address 
security awareness of normal users making them the weakest link (Aloul, 2012). 
The next section goes on to expand upon the human elements of cyber that 
affect cyber security awareness and behaviour. 
2.1.5 The Human Factor 
 
As organisations increase their use of advanced secure technologies with 
modern hardware and software, hackers are attempting to break into 
organisations by targeting the weakest link; the uneducated computer user 
(Katz, 2005). Whilst it is important to put in place technological defences and 
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employ cyber professionals to protect computer systems and networks, it is also 
important that all employees within an organisation are trained on basic cyber 
protection measures so that they are fully aware of the risks and vulnerabilities 
when connected to cyberspace. Furthermore, employee compliance to 
organisational information security policies, rules and guidelines needs to be put 
in place to reduce the threat from cyberspace. Bulgurcu, Hasan and Benbasat 
(2010) adopts the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) model to prove 
compliance behaviour depends on user intentions and then intentions are 
dependent on normative beliefs, attitudes and self-efficacy. Normative beliefs 
are one’s perception of how friends or close ones act in a certain way. Self-
efficacy refers to individual’s confidence on oneself to successfully act in a 
given situation and attitude is how someone feels about something (Fang and 
Shih, 2004). Kim, Rhee and Ryu (2009) study the importance of self-efficacy in 
information security and recommends being used to design cyber awareness 
programs. The study tested how much influence self-efficacy has on risk 
management behaviour and the intention to comply with security policies. 
Results from the study showed survey participants with high self-efficacy 
exhibited better cyber behaviour by adopting safe protective practices and 
showed intention to improve their security efforts. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the six interdependent layers of cyberspace as social, 
people, persona, information, network and real (HM Govt, 2016, p5). The social, 
people and persona layer belong to the cognitive domain of cyberspace and this 
is how humans interconnect with the cyberspace. To address the cognitive 
domain, it is imperative to ensure people are cyber trained and have awareness 
of basic protective cyber measures when connecting to the cyberspace. Not 
only this, it is also important to make sure that people apply safe security 
behaviours and have the motivation to avoid making themselves vulnerable to 





Figure 2 - Six Layers of Cyberspace (MOD Cyber Primer, 2016, p5) 
Changing information security behaviour is not just about giving employees 
information on risks associated with the cyberspace and protective practices 
that should be undertaken through preventative behaviour. Organisations must 
ensure employees understand and are willing to take these advice and this 
requires changes to attitude and intentions (Bada and Sasse, 2014).  
 
“One of the most intriguing findings from IBM’s 2014 Cyber Security Intelligence 
Index is that 95 percent of all security incidents involve human error” (Howarth, 
2014). These errors can be from malicious insiders from within the organisation 
or from someone who has accidentally breached security by mistake or due to 
poor organisational policies. Impact of human error leading to cyber incidents 
can hamper on an organisation’s ability to operate and loses the culture of trust 
within the workforce. For example, in 2017 ransomware WannaCry virus 
decapitated the UK’s National Health Services ability to operate for a significant 
period just because the computers were not kept up to date and latest software 
patches were not installed (BBC News, 2017b). Williams (2008) states that 
organisations often overlook the importance of workplace culture in defending 
the computer networks and just focuses on the perimeter defences such as 
intrusion detection, firewall etc. Governance of information security should be 
from strategic level and capture all the actions that are necessary to counter 




Ögütçü, Testik and Chouseinoglou (2014) states that “security is not a problem 
with technology but a problem of human nature and the effective behaviour of 
IS users and their security awareness which needs to be assessed, evaluated 
and addressed accordingly”. Ng Kankanhalli and Yunjie (2009) uses a Health 
Belief Model, adapted from the healthcare literature, to study users’ computer 
security behaviour. Furthermore, computer security behaviour not only includes 
using protective technologies but also behaviours such as selecting strong 
passwords, regular data backup and becoming careful when opening 
suspicious emails. It is important to understand what influences a computer 
user behaviour to be more motivated in complying with the organisational cyber 
security policies and align cyber security awareness programs accordingly. It is 
vital to understand what influences a user behaviour to adopt and be compliant 
of cyber security practices. This section explored the ‘human factor’ which has 
to be addressed for keeping IT systems and network safe from exploitation. The 
next section will look at a number of psychological models for predicting human 
behaviour.  
2.1.5.1 How is it possible to influence user actions for safe and secure 
Cyber Behaviour? 
 
“Actions and intentions do not always align” (Gilovich and Kruger, 
2004, p328). 
 
It would be fair to say that good intentions do not always follow with the correct 
actions. No matter how good the cyber strategy is for an organisation and how 
much there is done to raise cyber security awareness of employees, it is 
worthless if users do not take the necessary actions to prevent against cyber 
incidents from occurring and failing to show safe IT behaviour. Lebek  et al. 
(2014) conducted a detailed study on Information Systems (IS) behaviour using 
four psychological theories (Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB), General 
Deterrence Theory, Protection Motivation Theory and Technology Acceptance 
Model) to investigate factors influencing human behaviour. The study confirmed 
that all the models researched had their own factors that influenced behavioural 




It is important to understand the behavioural models available within 
psychological literature to identify how attitudes are linked to behavioural 
intentions. A model that is often used in academic studies is the TPB which was 
previously known as Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) developed by Ajzen and 
Fishbein in the 1980s. According to Arnold et al. (2005, p254) TRA model was 
first developed to highlight the relationship between attitudes and behaviour. 
TRA works in the belief that behaviour is linked to intentions and intentions 
linked to attitude. This later became the TPB with the addition of perceived 
behavioural control portion. The added portion was to do with the belief or self-
control that one must and can act in a certain way in different situations. Figure 
3 illustrates the concept of TPB. The model highlights that the way a human 
action takes place is dependent on the humans’ intentions and intentions can 
be shaped and predicted by behavioural beliefs, normative beliefs and 
subsequent attitudes. Fielding, McDonald and Louis (2008) uses the TPB model 
as applied to students in a sustainability conference to investigate engagement 
into environmental activism and found that that students with positive attitudes 
and normative beliefs had the intention to engage in the desired behaviours. 
 
Figure 3 - Theory of Planned Behaviour (Adapted from Hoeksma, Gerritzen, 
Lokhorst et al. 2017,p.17) 
Similarly, Fang and Shih (2018) successfully used the TPB model to predict 
customer’s intention to exhibit suitable online banking behaviour by measuring 
the factors influencing attitudes and behaviour. Since the model was introduced 
there have been many success stories in the employment of the model 
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(including health research) to influence behavioural actions. However, it has 
also not been short of criticism and researchers have critiqued about the 
predicted validity of the model as it fails to address unconscious behavioural 
influences such as affect and emotions (Sniehotta, Presseau and Araújo-
Soares, 2014, Ajzen, 2011). Conner (2015) argues that there is no evidence to 
support the views that critiques have made about the theory and researchers 
should continue adapting it and extend the theory to benefit their studies. The 
theory is relevant to cyber security as perceived behavioural control, attitude 
and normative beliefs can be used to predict behaviour of IT users. 
 
To improve cyber security, it is important to address these factors (attitude, 
subjective norms, behavioural control) which influences secure behaviours to 
ensure desired cyber behaviour is adopted by employees in an organisation. 
Unless these factors are understood clearly and addressed, cyber security 
awareness campaigns and education will prove to be futile in addressing cyber 
security risks and vulnerabilities within an organisation. Another factor that is 
linked with intention is ‘motivation’ which is crucial in translating intentions into 
desired behaviour (Bada and Sasse, 2014). It is important for employers to 
ensure motivation is taken into consideration in the cyber security awareness 
strategy in order to promote safe cyber security practices and behaviour. Figure 
4 illustrates Maslow’s hierarchy of needs which is a psychological motivational 
theory developed by Abraham Maslow (1954). 
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`    
  Figure 4 - Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs (Arnold et al., 2005, p313) 
Maslow’s model is based on human desires which includes, physiological, 
safety, belongingness, esteem and self-actualisation needs. In an organisation, 
these needs should be addressed and managed carefully by the employers to 
get the employees to show desired behaviours in cyber security. Another 
motivation theory include Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance theory which 
assumes behaviour as a function of cognitive process and interpretation of 
information and is key for employers to understand workplace behaviours. 
Harmon-Jones (2015, p.184) explains cognitive dissonance occurs when 
individuals have thoughts that are related but are inconsistent or when actions 
do not align their beliefs causing discomfort in the situation. The discomfort 
encourages the individual to reduce the dissonance by taking actions that align 
to his thoughts or by changing his thoughts to align with his actions. Ward and 
Meade (2018) uses cognitive dissonance to tackle careless responding of 
online surveys by including questions that increased cognitive dissonance in the 
participants. Through hypothesis testing, it was proven that careless responding 
reduced when participants’cognitive dissonance was changed. 
 
Technological Acceptance Model (TAM) is another theory which could impact 
the way how employees behave when they come to use IS or IT equipment. 
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Durlabhji and Fusilier (2005, p234) mentions “TAM states behavioural intention 
to use a technology derives from two beliefs”. The two beliefs are listed as 
perceived usefulness of technology and ease of use. It is imperative that 
employers address these beliefs so that employees perception of the system in 
use has a positive effect on behaviour. Whilst it is necessary to ensure attitude 
and intentions follow safe computing behaviour, it is also important to take into 
consideration the organisational culture in an organisation. Schlienger and 
Teufel (2003) mentions two facets of organisational culture as basic 
assumptions and beliefs which are exhibited by values, norms and knowledge 
of the organisation. These factors are also equally important to address in order 
bring desired behavioural changes in the employees. In addition to this, 
cultivating information security culture within an organisational culture is 
essential where users identify and adopt the most appropriate security controls 
successfully (Veiga and Eloff, 2010). 
 
Sharma, Warkentin and Shropshire (2015) in their study argues that intention 
may not be the best predictor for the actual behaviour and states personality 
traits works better when predicting variable behaviour. The study further intends 
to root out personality traits which influences people engaging with the correct 
cyber behaviour. Goldberg (1990) comes up with the concept of the ‘big five’ 
personal traits which are extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, 
neuroticism and openness (as shown in Table 1). 
Table 1 - Big Five Personality Traits (Adapted from Heinek and Anger, 2010, 
p536) 
Personality Traits Description 
Extraversion Outgoing, ambitious and sociability 
Agreeableness Cooperative and likeable  
Conscientiousness Degree of self control, need for achievement 
Neuroticism Someone tense, anxious or moody 




For researchers who do not have full confidence on the validity of TPB model, 
maybe personality traits is the way forward for predicting human behaviour. 
Sharma et al. (2015) in their study reported that people with conscientiousness 
and agreeableness traits had positive link with computer behaviour. An 
exploratory study conducted by Marks and Rezgui (2007) on ISA in higher 
education concluded that factors such as conscientiousness, cultural 
assumptions and beliefs and social conditions affected the behaviour and 
attitude of university staff.  
 
This section explored different human psychological models to explore factors 
that have direct influence over behaviour. The next section will look at whether 
demographics have any influence on cyber security awareness and behaviour. 
2.1.5.2 Is Cyber Security affected by Demographics? 
 
Humans are often targets to hackers who use social engineering techniques to 
exploit our systems and networks to steal information or with other malicious 
intentions. It is important for employers to understand the demographic 
background of their workforce to determine their likelihood of becoming victims 
of cyber-attacks through social engineering. This will help in devising a cyber 
security strategy which can take into consideration the demographic aspect of 
employees in an organisation, especially if there is relationship between 
demographics and susceptibility to attack. Aloul, Darwish and Zarka (2013) 
carried out a study to understand victim’s background and personality traits to 
phishing attacks; a very popular form of attack used by hackers. The study 
makes comments that factors such as demographics could have a link to users 
getting victimised of phishing attacks. Table 2 illustrates the demographics vs 
phishing susceptibility (Aloul et al., 2013). The personality trait results from this 
experiment contradicted with the study that Sharma et al. (2015) conducted 
where it was reported that people with agreeableness personality had better 
cyber behaviour. The research for using personality traits to predict computer 




Table 2 - Demographics Vs Phishing Susceptibility (Aloul et al., 2013, p5) 
 Highly Susceptible Less Susceptible 
Age 18 -24 years old or less 25 years old or more 
Gender Female Male 
Anti-phishing Training No Training Anti-Phishing trained 
Education Humanities Computer Science 
Training Delivery 
Method 
Non-embedded Embedded (in games for 
example) 
Personality Agreeableness Conscientiousness 
Internet Usage 
Behaviour 
E-commerce and Online 
Banking 
Emails and simple browsing 
 
The term phishing means how hackers coax their victims to provide them 
personal information through social engineering attacks. It is a very common 
form of attack used by hackers to gain sensitive information and use it to their 
advantage. Many studies have taken place using role-play techniques to 
establish relations between user demographics and likelihood of falling victim to 
a phishing attack. A role-play study conducted by Sheng, Holbrook, 
Kumaraguru et.al. (2010) concluded that 18 – 25-year-old are more susceptible 
to phishing and females are more likely to fall in trap of phishing than males, 
therefore converging with the findings of Aloul et al. (2013).  
 
This section covered a number of human behavioural models to understand the 
relationship between attitude, intention and behaviour. It also covered that 
personality traits are key to observe variation in human behaviour. Finally, past 
research indicated that it might be important to consider demographics when 
attempting to measure cyber security awareness and behaviour. The following 





2.1.6 Cyber Security Awareness Measurement Frameworks  
 
One of the key objective for this research is to investigate whether there are any 
frameworks available in literature to measure cyber security awareness. To be 
able to quantify basic user cyber awareness for an organisation will be very 
beneficial for employers, as the results can be used to drive cyber awareness 
programs and change policies to address where shortfall exists. By addressing 
these cyber awareness shortfalls and implementing cyber education and 
training programs, organisations can influence business continuity and 
organisational sustainability to protect their networks and people against 
malicious users and activities. The effectiveness of such training programs can 
also be tested using an awareness measurement framework. 
 
The brand that R SIGNALS are known by is ‘Leaders of the Digital Age’. This is 
because the organistion is responsible for providing agile and rich information 
services, networks and infrastruture to the Army whether deployed abroad on 
Operations or on training activities within the UK. Although, R SIGNALS soldiers 
and officers deal with IT equipment and networks as part of daily their business 
processes, there is currently no measurement framework in place to assess 
basic user cyber security awareness. The author intends to close this gap by 
creating one which will measure basic cyber awareness and behaviour of 
computer users in the R SIGNALS. The author adapts and extends the NCSC 
cyber security infographic guide (shown in Figure 5) to create and measure five 
areas of cyber security. The guide makes further claims that time, money and 
business’ reputation can be saved by following the basic cyber protective 
practices to protect against common form of cyber attacks (NCSC, 2017). There 
were five measurement themes chosen for awareness which was Device 
Backup, Device Safety, Malware, Phishing, Password Safety and one theme for 
behaviour and these will be tested using Awareness and Frequency Likert 
scales. The framework will need refining and further validation before it can be 





Figure 5 -NCSC Cyber Security for Small Businesses (NCSC, 2017) 
Niekerk and Solms (2013) mentions that the term cyber security is often 
interchangeable with information security. Although the two terms ‘cyber 
security’ and ‘information security’ are similar in meaning the term cyber 
security is more to do with securing the cyber space and the entities (devices, 
system, infrastructure, network, information, people) within them whereas 
information security is to do with protecting confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of information and the devices and servers that hold the data. The 
present study will look at a number of measurement frameworks for ISA and 
look at the benefits of utilising them to capture or measure cyber security 
awareness in an organisation.   
 
From the literature review, it was identified that many academics have 
conducted measurements of security awareness through use of their own 
unique frameworks. Ng, Kankanhalli and Xu (2009) highlights that there is a 
shortage of empirical evidence to indicate that security training and awareness 
programs are enough for people to show safe computing behaviour. 
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Wahyudiwan, Suchayo and Gandhi (2017) in their case study to improve 
information security within public services uses seven focus areas as shown in 
Figure 6 to test ISA. The study made use of an online questionnaire to assess 
ISA using knowledge, attitude and behaviour as variables.  The study results 
identified that knowledge had influence over attitude and behaviour and attitude 
had influence over behaviour. 
`   
Figure 6 - Focus Areas for ISA (Wahyudiwan, Suchayo and Gandhi, 2017, p.655) 
 
Lebek et al. (2014) recommends the use of Intended Behaviour (IB) scale rather 
than using the Actual Behaviour (AB) scale to assess security-complaint 
behaviour. He further added that it is important to recognise the factors that 
influence intended behaviour rather than measuring ISA to protect organisation 
against information breaches. 
 
To practise safe cyber security practices, organisations should design security 
awareness programmes and cyber security training events to ensure 
employees are fully aware of safe practices when using computing technology. 
However, awareness on its own is just not enough, users should align their 
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behavioural actions. Therefore, it is useful if cyber security awareness 
measurement models can be used on employees to test their awareness level 
and to investigate whether their knowledge and awareness aligns with safe 
computing behaviour. Ögütçü et al. (2016) created a framework (questionnaire) 
with the aim to assess the relationship between people’s risk perception and 
behaviour using four independent scales which were Risky Behaviour Scale 
(RBS), Conservative Behaviour Scale, Exposure to Offence Scale (EoS) and 
Risk Perception Scale (RPS). One of the significant findings from the study is to 
do with survey participants’ education level and information security training. It 
is reported that that participants with better education level and those who had 
information security training were more security aware than others. These 
findings complement Aloul et al (2013) phishing experiment to measure ISA. 
Although the model has been found useful in measuring ISA, Parsons, Calic, 
Pattinson et al. (2017) criticises the model for not having a holistic 
measurement for all aspects of awareness and behaviour and makes further 
comments that it is still at early stages of development with minimal assessment 
on validity and reliability. 
 
Parsons et al. (2017) takes a different approach with a framework called the 
Human Aspect of Information Security (HAIS) model where he uses a 
Knowledge Attitude and Behaviour (KAB) model and a follow-up phishing 
experiment to measure ISA. Through evidence it is reported that the framework 
can predict security behaviour and justifies why it is better than other 
measurements which deals with only certain aspects of ISA. There are other 
models of behaviours such as the Health Belief Model (Ng et al, 2009) that 
relate to ISA but these models only explain some aspects of ISA. It does not 
provide an all-inclusive view of security awareness as the one Parsons et al. 
offers that has been tested rigorously with diverse populations and has proved 
useful and reliable. One area which can be further exploited by this measure is 
personality traits (Sharma et al., 2015) which has influence on how humans 
adopt safe computing behaviour. The model is designed to be modular 
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therefore it is possible to use portion of the model if there is no requirement to 
use it fully.  
 
Lastly, Kruger and Kearney (2006) measures the effectiveness of awareness 
campaigns in a mining company by a prototype model for ISA. Awareness 
campaigns are not just about bringing in technological defences, setting up 
security policies but ensuring users are aware of the risks associated with cyber 
security and also their roles to minimise risks of a breach. The model was 
brought in to measure the effectiveness of ISA campaigns used to enhance 
safe computing behaviour. The model looks at a common technique used in 
social psychology of how people think and behave and examines the 
knowledge, attitude and behaviour to measure ISA and to evaluate the 
effectiveness of awareness campaigns. To ensure awareness campaigns are 
successful in bringing change to cyber security awareness and behaviour in an 
organisation, it is important to ensure that the campaigns are bringing positive 
changes and the methods need to be reviewed regularly and measured for 
effectiveness. 
 
This section looked at the innovative cyber measurement framework that the 
author has created for this research to address cyber security awareness in the 
R SIGNALS. A number of other models were also explored which academics 
have used in the past to measure ISA and address safe computing behaviour.  
 
The following section will now look at the importance of cyber security 
awareness delivery methods and the reasons why it needs to be effective for 
increasing cyber security awareness and behaviour. 
2.1.7 Common and Proven Cyber Awareness Delivery Methods 
 
For small enterprises and organisations, it is easier to communicate direction, 
policies about information security from management to employees who work at 
ground level. However, for big organisations this can be challenging because 
employees can be in physically dispersed locations or there is minimal 
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opportunity for management to disseminate strategic information to the 
employees as there are no direct lines of communications between employees 
and management level (Solms and Solms, 2004). Lebek et al (2014) suggests 
information security policies, security training and awareness programs as non-
technical measures to improve safe computing behaviour in an organisation. 
Deloitte (2012) recommends organisations must implement good cyber security 
frameworks which complies with International Security Standard (ISO) 27001 
(Guidelines for Information Security) and the technical controls to protect 
against social engineering attacks, hacking, malware, spyware and unwanted 
softwares included in ISO 27032 (Guidelines for Cyber Security). The 
information from these standards must also be used when designing cyber 
awareness campaigns. 
 
There are many proven methods of delivering cyber training and awareness. 
Training types can range from classroom based training to interactive games. 
Awareness can be promoted with the use of news bulletin, noticeboards, 
newspapers, emails, posters etc. Cone, Irvine and Thompson (2007) breaks 
down awareness and training into formal training sessions (instructor-led), 
passive computer based training or web-based training, strategic placement of 
awareness messages and interactive computer based training through use of 
virtual world scenarios including the human and the technical factors. Interactive 
games were proven to be effective due to the problem-solving approach the 
training exposs the trainees to. The virtual game-based training allowed 
participants to be part of role-based scenarios where they are decision makers 
in performing actions to complete information security objectives. Abawajy and 
Kim (2010) conducted research to find out the most effective ISA training 
delivery methods amongst text-based, game-based and video presentation. 
Their research concluded that combined method was the most effect out of all. 
Similarly, Abawajy (2014) breaks security awareness training into three areas; 
web-based training, contextual training and embedded training. In his study, 
again it was proven that combined training delivery methods was better than 
individual training methods. Many researchers have utilised Phishing to 
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increase ISA. Carver, Dodge Jr and Ferguson (2007) uses phishing for 
evaluating the effectiveness of security awareness program in the US Military 
Academy and finds it to be a useful training method for increasing awareness 
on cyber security.  
 
Chen, Medlin and Shaw (2008) states that the effectiveness of information 
security training delivery methods depends on the cultural background as he 
found out that training program was more effective with the US students than 
with the Taiwanese although both groups had the same type of training. This 
means that when training program are designed it is important to consider the 
background of the people being trained. Korpela (2015) recommends the use of 
learning analytics, an area of data analytics to provide added value to the cyber 
awareness programs and potentially using data from firewall logs, learning 
management systems, awareness programs etc to design effective cyber 
security awareness delivery methods. 
 
This section researched on the importance of cyber awareness training delivery 
methods and provided an overview of methods that have been proven effective 
in past research. The next section will look at capability maturity models that 
can be use to assess cyber security maturity states. 
 
2.1.8 Cyber Security Capability Maturity Model 
 
“A maturity model allows an organisation or industry to have its 
practices, processes, and methods evaluated against a clear 
set of artefacts that establish a benchmark. These artefacts 
typically represent best practice and may incorporate standards 
or other codes of practice that are important in a particular 
domain or discipline” (Caralli and Butkovic, 2013, p.1). 
 
One of the main objectives of this study is to evaluate cyber security maturity 
state of R SIGNALS and benchmark it using a Capability Maturity Model 
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(CMM). CMM were first developed to improve software development and 
management processes. The model can be applied to cyber security to 
continuously improve cyber security processes and practices. Hoang and Le 
(2007) carries out an investigative study into CMM and its application to cyber 
security and provides benefits of using the model. The first model developed by 
Humphrey’s (1989, cited in Hoang and Le, 2007) was to improve quality of 
softwares and had five maturity levels as shown in Figure 7. 
   
Figure 7 - Humphreys Capability Maturity Levels (1989, cited in Hoang and Le, 
2007, p.4)) 
For each maturity level the software had to be of a certain quality and had to 
complete a set of designated practices. This was an evolutionary approach to 
software quality development and allowed benchmarking to the CMM levels. 
The model can be modified to represent cyber security capability maturity states 
for organisational performance on cyber security. 
From the maturity model which Humphries first developed in 1989, there are 
numerous capability maturity models that are employed by organisations to 
improve their processes and practices for software development, knowledge 
management, data management, businesses or improving their IT risk 
management posture. There are very few that have been used assess the 
cyber security maturity of an organisation. In order to gauge an organisations’ 
cyber security capability maturity it is important to consider how best to measure 
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the human organisational elements of cyber. The next section considers 
suitable measurements that already exists. 
2.1.9 Measures and Metrics of Cyber Security Capability Maturity 
 
Curtis and Mehravari (2015) examines two Cyber CMM used by the US 
Department of Energy (DoE) sector and highlights the benefits of using the 
models to improve cyber security capabilities and promoting safe practices. The 
model used for the electricity sector uses three maturity levels (Initiated, 
Performed and Managed) to assess maturity state as shown in Figure 8. The 
model was split into ten domains and to reach a maturity level, a number of 
cyber security practices had to be completed for each domain. 
 
Figure 8 - Cyber CMM Model for US Electricity Sector (Curtisand 
Mehravari, 2015, p.4) 
Another model developed by White (2011) is called the ‘Community Cyber 
Security Capability Maturity Model (CCSCMM) which is used a ‘yardstick’ for 
developing cyber security programs for communities. The yardstick is based on 
three mechanisms; establishing the current maturity state, a strategy to improve 
the maturity state and then a plan to share experiences and lessons learnt with 
other communities. His model is shown in Figure 9. Each level of the CCSCMM 
requires completing a pre-determined cyber security practices before 




Figure 9 - Community Cyber Security Maturity Model (White, 2011, p175) 
For an organisation to be have the defensive measure against cyber threats 
and vulnerabilities, it is important to ensure the cyber security posture is in place 
and process for improvements are highlighted. Maturity models helps 
benchmark current level of maturity in a particular discipline and also help clarify 
what needs improving to progress onto the next maturity level.  
 
Barclay (2014) in her study introduces another Cybersecurity Capability Maturity 
Model which includes six levels as shown in Figure 10. The model is designed 
to illustrate the level of readiness for any cyber security related threats and 
vulnerabilities. Each of the levels has different indicators which includes a 
number of practices that has to be achieved before progressing to the next 





Figure 10 - Cyber Capability Maturity Model (Barclay, 2014, p.7) 
All capability models researched for this study have a similar method of 
capturing maturity state for improving business processes or cyber security 
capabilities. Therefore, organisations that want to adopt a model can use any of 
the models and modify to their own unique requirements. This research will be 
using White’s (2011) model to reflect R SIGNALS’ maturity state on user cyber 
security awareness and beahaviour. 
In this section, a number of capability maturity models that have been used in 
the past have been explored and the benefits of using them explained. The next 
section will look at UK cyber strategy and how it relates to Defence. 
2.1.10 UK and Defence Cyber Security Strategy 
 
The UK Cyber Security Strategy (2011, p.11) refers to ‘cyberspace’ as “an 
interactive domain made up of digital networks that are used to store, modify 
and communicate information”.  
The National Security Strategy (2016) indicate ICT has evolved and is in every 
aspect of our lives, technologies and geopolitical landscape has extended way 
beyond humans can imagine. As technology is developing malicious activities 
by criminals still continue to happen as cyberspace boundary increases with 
connection to nation’s critical infrastructure such as power grids, air-traffic 
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control and traffic controls etc. Basic cyber hygiene amongst users in the 
cyberspace has to be effective so that threats are removed and risks reduced to 
as low as practicable (ALARP). “The future of the UK’s security and prosperity 
rests on digital foundations. The challenge of our generation is to build a 
flourishing digital society that is both resilient to cyber threats, and equipped 
with the knowledge and capabilities required to maximise opportunities and 
manage risks” (National Cyber Security Strategy, 2016, p.9) . 
The SDSR (2015) mentioned about addressing the risks and vulnerabilities 
posed by the cyberspace with an effective cyber security programme. For the 
military it is crucial that risks from cyberspace are mitigated and our systems, 
networks and infrastructure protected together with the confidentiality, integrity 
and availability of the data/information hosted in the cyberspace. Joint Force 
Cyber Group (JFCyG) was created in 2013 to deliver defence’s cyber capability 
(Defence Intranet, 2014) and staffed by Army, Navy and Airforce and civilians 
with various cyber skillsets in support of the national cyber activity (Air Cdr 
Brazier, 2014).  
Both the Navy and Airforce have a cyber security strategy whereas the Army 
currently do not have one. The Airforce Cyber strategy was first implemented in 
2014 through RAF cyber programme and simplified trifold was created and 
distributed to every organisation with the view of raising cyber security 
awareness. The strategy includes five strategic objectives which includes cyber 
awareness through training, education and career management. 
Similarly, the Royal Navy has a cyber security strategy (2011) which outlines 
the vision into several high-level objectives which includes developing 
personnel and training to enhance cyber awareness, understanding risks and 
vulnerabilities of cyberspace and development of a defensive posture, cyber 
manoeuvrability and effect through doctrine and via ensuring cyber is integrated 
across naval service. “By 2020 The Royal Navy intends to be a cyber aware 
force which has the capability to operate in a contested cyberspace and 
maintain information superiority” (Royal Navy, 2011). 
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Like the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy, there is a need for the Army to 
develop a cyber strategy to provide direction in the field of cyber and 
implementing cyber security program.  This would be very useful to enhance the 
defensive posture and equally raise cyber security awareness and conduct 
training to avoid becoming a cause for cyber incidents to our detriment. 
2.1.11 Research Context – The Royal Corps of Signals 
“The R SIGNALS structure has been designed to provide a force 
that can deliver a robust, resilient and secure network of 
information services for the 21st century. This requires a range of 
new skills including expertise in software, data management and 
exploitation, and Cyber” (ACIN 15/17, 2017). 
R SIGNALS is an organisation within the Army which provides combat 
command support to deployable forces on operations or training exercises and 
are Army’s battlefield communicators and information systems provider. 
“Everywhere the Army deploys – from special forces and intelligence gathering 
teams to personnel deployed in armoured vehicles, the R SIGNALS deploy” (R 
SIGNALSb, 2018). The organisation has been involved in every operations that 
the Army has taken part in providing satellite communications, voice and data 
networks and application services to deployed forces. R SIGNALS holds and 
manages state of the art technological equipment, systems and networks at 
home and in the deployed space which requires all users to be aware of the 
threats and vulnerabilities presented by the cyberspace. 
There are currently 859 officers and 6723 soldiers in the R SIGNALS dispersed 
within units at different geographical locations in and outside of the UK. There 
are in total 6 trades for R SIGNALS soldiers which are listed as below: 
a. Communication Logistic Specialist 
b. Communication Systems Engineer 
c. Communication Systems Operator 
d. Electronic Warfare Systems Operator 
e. Installation Technicians 
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f. R SIGNALS electricians  
Soldiers go through their trade training in Blandford and get qualified to be 
employed in their role and upon finishing training they are posted to their 
working units. The trades that are more technical are communications systems 
engineer and communications systems operator as they need to have a good 
understanding of technologies and information systems. Hence, they are 
expected to be more cyber aware than the other trades due to the training and 
exposure they have with networks and systems compared to the other trade 
groups. 
The officer cohort are made up of Late Entry (LE) Officers and Direct Entry (DE) 
officers.  LE officers are ones who promote from the ranks and have mostly 
done full service as a soldier. LE officers generally fall into two categories; 
technical and non-technical. The technical officers are those who are in a 
technical trade-group by background and pursue their career either as a 
Telecommunications Officer Technical (TOT) or a Traffic Officer (Tfc Offr). 
These officers are more experienced in service and the technology that R 
SIGNALS employ in order to provide networks, infrastructure and services to 
the customers. The LE officers on non-technical posts are those who are in 
general administration, welfare, career management, logistic role etc. DE 
officers join the military directly as an officer and are in average young in 
service and experience and less exposed to the technologies that R SIGNALS 
use. DE officers are generally more educated than soldiers due to the education 
entry criteria to get selected as officers in the Army. 
This context can be considered to be a priority for gauging cyber security in an 
Army context and could prove key to enabling Army to develop its own cyber 
security policies and practices. For instances, lapses in cyber security capability 
here could have wide ranging impact on MOD activities and goals worldwide. 
The combination of technical and non-technical roles, DE and LE officers may 
make R SIGNALS ideal for gauging Army specific demographics that effect the 




In this chapter a bounded literature review was conducted in cyber security 
awareness, measurement frameworks, behavioural models and cyber security 
maturity models. The literature review was an exploratory study to address the 
research aim and objectives and make comparison with the results obtained 
through a survey questionnaire which was designed by the author to measure 
cyber security awareness and behaviour. More details was provided on how the 
author constructed his own framework for measuring awareness and behaviour 
using NCSC’s infographics on cyber security for small businesses. 
To improve cyber security awareness in an organisation it is important to 
understand behavioural aspects of employees and what makes them adopt safe 
computing behaviour. Ultimately, employers must ensure awareness and 
intentions are translated into desired security behaviour. So cyber security 
awareness is not only to do with how much knowledge someone has with 
regards to the protective practices but about whether that knowledge is put into 
actions when required. 
A number of frameworks were examined to investigate past measurement 
frameworks that have been used by academics to measure cyber security 
awareness. The most suitable one is from Parsons et al. (2017) which uses a 
questionnaire to measure knowledge, attitude and behaviour and has been 
rigorously tested for validity and reliability. 
Cyber security capability maturity models were also examined to determine the 
most suitable to benchmark cyber maturity state in the R SIGNALS. A number 
of maturity models were explored and past research indicated that they are 
perfect medium to assess capability maturity state and has been used by 
different sectors of government in the US. White (2011) developed a cyber 
security maturity model which is most suitable to utilise for this study as it is 
simple to use and is flexible irrespective of the size of an organisation, 






This section will include the research philosophies, methodology and methods 
adopted throughout the study and justify the research approach taken. This 
research is conducted to investigate how cyber awareness can be measured 
and mapped against a capability maturity model to provide recommendations 
for future cyber training in the R SIGNALS. The research is an adaptation and 
extension of the UK government National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) 
infographic framework for cyber awareness which was used to develop a 
questionnaire with the aim of investigating cyber awareness and behaviour of 
the participants. The questionnaire has 59 items divided into demographics, 
awareness and behaviour specific questions broken down in six themes (Data 
Backup, Device Safety, Malware, Phishing, Passwords and Behaviour). This 
chapter will also define the rationale behind the methodological and 
philosophical choices for the study and explain how the research questions 
have been addressed.  
3.1 Research Philosophy 
“A methodology cannot be derived from research but instead has 
to be grounded in that form of a priori theoretical knowledge 
usually referred to as ‘philosophy” (Car, 2006). 
When taking research studies, it is important to understand the philosophical 
stance and take the right approach to gather data for the research. The 
selection of correct philosophy is an important part of research methodology as 
it addresses the beliefs and assumptions that the author should consider when 
carrying out the study. This research follows the research onion (Saunders et 
al., 2009, p108) illustrated in Figure 11 and the philosophical layer is the outer 
layer which has to be addressed first. From then on, the inner layers will be 
peeled and examined to devise the best research approach for the thesis. For 
this study research philosophy will be positivist with a deductive approach. 
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Research strategy will include an online survey using a set of quantitative 
questions. Time horizon will be cross-sectional and data collection methods will 
be through an online questionnaire distributed to the sample population. 
“The research philosophy you adopt contains important assumptions and beliefs 
about the way in which you view the world. These assumptions will underpin 
your research strategy and the methods you choose as part of that strategy” 
(Saunders et al, 2009, p108). Choosing the correct philosophical approach 
allows the author to lead into adopting the right methodology for the research 
and help into formulating a research strategy that is relevant to the development 
of the knowledge for the study and answering the research questions. 
 
 
Figure 11 - Research Onion (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009) 
 “In research it is important to identify the philosophical and theoretical 
assumptions that lead to the choice of appropriate methodology” (Dobson, 
2001, p200). Before selecting what methodology to use, it is also important to 
understand the philosophical stance for the research. Both ontological and 
epistemological positions for the research has been analysed to enable the 
author to select the right methodology. “Philosophy is generally concerned with 
three basic issues; being (ontology), knowing (epistemology) and acting 
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(axiology)” (Denzin and Lincoln 2000). The ontological position in a research 
allows the researcher to understand the reality in the world about the knowledge 
we know and what is true, epistemological position provides a perspective of 
what we think is true and how we know about it and axiological position explains 
what is beneficial about the research and how we should act. The justification of 
choosing a certain methodology can be supported and informed by the 
philosophical position adopted for the research. Lynham and Ruona (2004, 
p155) explains the three components of philosophy as illustrated in Figure 12 as 
a framework for congruent and coherent system of thought and action. The 
interconnected components as part of the philosophical framework allows us to 
realise how we think and see the world. Saunders et al. (2009, p108) 
recommends not to make a judgement that one research philosophy is superior 
than another as it depends what the research is about and what kind of 
knowledge is being developed through the research questions. 
    
Figure 12 - A Philosophical Framework for Thought and Practice (Lynham and 
Ruona, 2014, p155) 
The reason for taking ontological approach is because the research will be 
conducted based on how the researcher view the reality of cyber security 
awareness and the knowledge that exists about the research question. In 
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addition to this, it is about discovering knowledge that is unknown and external 
to the researcher.  
Looking at the Layer 1 of the research onion illustrated in Figure 11, there are a 
number of philosophical stances that can be examined to find out which best fits 
the criteria to answer the research questions. This research will follow a 
positivist approach and use quantitative technique for data collection from 
soldiers and officers from the R SIGNALS. From the results a deductive 
approach will be used for generalisation. The role of the researcher will be 
neutral on this study and research of this nature is high in reliability which 
means it can produce accurate replicable measurements and represent the 
population but it is not good for validity. Reliable means replicable 
measurements and validity alludes to inductive insights. The research is not 
creating a theory although is supported by an academic narrative backing in the 
literature review. The approach will be to measure and analyse cyber security 
awareness and behaviour and its implications within R SIGNALS.  
Positivist research approach is ideal for social research and generates statistics 
as evidence to support the study. It is scientific in nature and looks at the hard 
facts with an objective view to a problem. In the context of this research, a 
positivist approach will be ideal for efficient and effective data collection through 
a utility of an online survey questionnaire using Qualtrics to assess cyber 
security awareness and behaviour of officers and soldiers in the R SIGNALS. It 
will also provide data which can be used to provide statistics and as evidence in 
this research. However, Veiga (2016) states that although survey 
questionnaires provide precise and accurate measures there might be 
instances when survey participants may find questions ambiguous and the 
cyber security awareness background may not be the same for all. Hence, an 
interpretivist approach i.e. a qualitative method may be useful to prod and 
obtain more information on the results provided by the questionnaire. This study 
is an exploratory application of a deductive approach taking into account a 
positivist philosophical approach as it will enable the results from the statistical 
analysis to be compared with the outcome from the literature review. The 
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framework developed from the government cyber awareness infographics and 
theoretical position from the literature review will be utilized by adopting a 
deductive approach to test against the data obtained from the survey 
questionnaire. Saunders et al. (2009) mentions that a survey strategy is usually 
associated with the deductive approach and provides an easy way to collect 
data from a sizeable population without much hassle. The survey strategy will 
also allow to capture opinions, behaviour and attributes of the population in 
terms of the research questions. A number of hypothesis will be tested on the 
quantitative data collected from the questionnaire. 
3.2 Participants 
3.2.1 Sampling Strategy 
To capture the right data for the research it is important to select appropriate 
samples to ensure generalisation can be made from the results obtained from 
the survey. Generalisation, which is an act of reasoning from which inferences 
can be made from observations, is widely-acknowledged as a quality standard 
in quantitative research, but is more controversial in qualitative research (Beck 
and Polit, 2010). According to Saunders et al. (2009) sampling techniques 
provide a range of methods which allows considering data from a sub-group 
than an entire population. This enables reduction of data required to be 
collected for the research but is good enough to make inferences about the 
population. For this research, it was not possible to capture all members of R 
SIGNALS in the survey given the dispersed nature of geographical locations of 
units and the officers and soldiers. Not only this, the time allocated for the 
dissertation was not enough to capture every single member of the 
organisation. Therefore, it was decided that a sample of the population would 
be chosen to take part in the survey questionnaire. Initially, the intention was to 
include soldiers and officers from 16 Signal Regiment; the author’s home 
Regiment. However, it was deemed that the number of participants for the 
survey would not be enough, hence the survey was pushed out to other R 
SIGNALS units. Figure 13 illustrates what sample and individual elements mean 




Figure 13 - Population, Sample and Individual cases (Saunders et al., 2009, p211) 
Maxwell and Delaney (2004) mentions the importance of sample size and how it 
affects statistical significance with larger samples producing stable statistics and 
reduced sampling error. Saunders et al. (2009) divides sampling techniques into 
two types which are as follows: 
a. Probability or representative sampling 
b. Non-probability or judgmental sampling 
Probability sampling is highly suitable for quantitative research where 
inferences can be made about the population through statistical measurements. 
In this type of sampling design everyone in the population has an equal 
probability for being selected in the sample and is considered to be highly 
representive of the overall population. It was considered that probability 
sampling would be possible for this research as it was considered achievable to 
provide a sample population from the R SIGNALS to be included in the survey. 
In non-probability sampling each unit in the population do not have a specific 
probability of getting selected as a sample hence this type of sampling 
technique can be non-representative of the population albeit some 
generalisation can be made. The technique used for this research will include 
probability sampling as there will be a need to answer the research question 
and address the objectives using statistical analysis from the survey.  Although 
it is impossible to capture every single serving soldiers and officers from the R 
SIGNALS, the sample selected is relevant to the research questions and 
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objectives. Newman (2014) states that a properly conducted probability 
sampling will be economical for gathering data on an entire population. 
According to Saunders et al. (2009) probability sampling is divided into four 
stages which includes deciding on the sampling frame, sample size, selection of 
sampling technique and ensuring sample represents the population under 
study. 
The manning figures (Army Personnel Centre, 2018) reported the total 
population in the R SIGNALS as 7582 of which 6723 are soldiers and 859 
officers. The percentage breakdown is approximately 88% soldiers and 12% 
officers and are employed in different units within R SIGNALS or attached to 
other organisations.  The targeted population frame used will be 7582 for this 
research. Once the sampling frame is obtained, it is important to decide on the 
appropriate sample size as this will be crucial in the generalisation that will be 
made to address the research questions from the data collected. Saunders et 
al. (2009, p218) states that “statisticians have shown that a sample size of 30 or 
more will usually result in a sampling distribution for the mean that is very close 
to normal distribution”. The size of the sample must be representative of the 
population under research which will boost confidence on the data collected. 
Figure 14 (Saunders et al., 2009) provides the formula for calculating the 
minimum sample size. Once the minimum sample size is calculated then 
adjusted minimum sample size using the formula in Figure 15 can be calculated 




Figure 14 - Calculating Minimum Sample Size (Saunders et al., 2009, p581) 
 
Figure 15 - Adjusted Minimum Sample Size (Saunders et al., 2009, p582) 
3.2.1.1 Minimum Sample Size 
Using the formula in Figure 14, the minimum sample size is as follows: 
p% = 88 (percentage of soldiers) 
q% = 12 (percentage of officers) 
z = 1.96  
e% = 5 (margin of error %) 








3.2.1.2 Adjusted Minimum Sample Size 
Now using formula in Figure 15, the adjusted minimum sample size is as 
follows: 
n = minimum sample size = 162.62 
N = Total population = 7582 
Adjusted minimum Sample Size (n’) = 159.28 
3.2.2 Sample Selection   
Once the minimum sample size was calculated it was important to ensure the 
representation of soldiers and officers in the sample correlated with the 
percentage difference between the two in the total population. To get 100% 
accuracy would be impossible given the scope and timeframe of the MSc 
thesis, however the split of samples that took part in the survey was 
approximately 70% soldiers and 30% officers. This was deemed reasonable to 
start with the data collection. As it was not possible to get the required sample 
from the author’s home regiment, the invitation to take part in the survey 
questionnaire was extended to other regiments and puddles of R SIGNALS 
personnel present in other organisations. These were additional efforts to 
achieve a representative sample using multiple participation routes. There was 
no requirement to have a split of gender in the sample selected. The invitation 
to take part in the survey took place using two approaches. First approach was 
asking the Commanding Officers of each Regiment to grant permission to roll 
out the survey in his/her unit. The second approach was by using Whatsapp or 
Mobile Phone messaging to send the survey link to subjects who the author 
knew personally. These approaches allowed the author to contact enough 
participants to take part in the survey questionnaire.  
The online survey was created with the intent to measure cyber security 
awareness and understand cyber security behaviour of R SIGNALS personnel. 
It is important to understand the demographics and characteristics of the 
respondents taking part in the survey. Hence the survey included a number of 
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demographic questions that would later on assist with identifying bias in 
answers presented by the respondents. Demographics information for this 
survey included age, gender, rank, officer or soldier, length of time served, 
trade, cyber training and level of education. The demographics information will 
be used to test the hypothesis presented for the research and investigate 
differences in responses from respondents from different background. The 
research was conducted on military personnel and did not include MOD 
employed civilians. 
3.2.3 Design and Materials 
The survey questionnaire was created with an online software tool called 
Qualtrics available through Cranfield University. Qualtrics is a data collection 
platform which is easy to use and is mobile device friendly which meant that 
participants could access the survey from anywhere from any device with a 
connection to internet. The tool not only provided means for creating a 
questionnaire but had the features to provide basic analysis of data and 
exporting data to be analysed by rigorous software tools. Zhou, Zhou, Chen et 
al. (2017, p.710) states that “online surveys can establish asynchronous 
contacts with respondents on the move, achieve faster, simpler and cheaper 
surveys, improve the quality of survey responses”. For this research the data 
collection technique had to be in the form of an online survey questionnaire to 
capture the information required with the constraints imposed by the time 
available to complete the dissertation and the number of participants that was 
required. Traditional paper survey was considered but this would bring the 
challenge of keeping the survey anonymous and also getting hold of the 
required number of intended participants resulting in lower survey completion 
rates.   
3.2.4 Questionnaire Design 
The survey design incorporated traditional survey principles and adopted the 
Likert scale questionnaire first developed in the 1930s to capture the 
quantitative data from the respondents. An example Likert scale used is 




  Figure 16 - Example Likert Scale on Agreement 
When the questions were originally designed four types of Likert scale was 
adopted (importance, frequency, awareness, agreement) however, this was 
reduced down to two 5-point Likert scales (frequency and awareness) due to 
problems it may create during data analysis phase and having to analyse each 
type of Likert scales separately. Furthermore, the reduction of Likert scale types 
was to potentially combine items in a meaningful way that might show 
systematic variation in either Frequency of behaviour or Awareness of the 
participants. 
The questions in the themes were designed to capture cyber security behaviour 
and cyber security awareness amongst survey participants. “Likert scales 
provide an ordinal-level measure of a person’s attitude and are often called 
summated-rating or additive scales as a participant’s score is calculated by 
summing the number of responses they give” (Neuman, 2014, p230). The 
questions design was intended such that they were unambiguous, short and 
concise to make it more appealing to participate for the respondents. A full copy 
of the questionnaire is attached in Appendix B. Some example items include: 
 
 
It was important to create a front page in the questionnaire to ensure 
participants were aware of the type of survey that they were taking part in and 
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to obtain consent before proceeding with the participation in the survey. This 
part also explained about the anonymity of the survey and how all data would 
be stored securely and held in strict confidence. Following on from this was the 
information on the background or demographics of the participants. This was 
very important to ensure the sample contained right percentage breakdown of 
officers and soldiers in the R SIGNALS. Further information on officers and 
soldiers also had to be extrapolated from the questionnaire to spot any linkage 
or relation between cyber awareness/behaviour and demographics such as 
cyber education, time served in the military, age group, rank range, trade and 
level of education for the participants. This information would later be used to 
test a number of hypothesis created for the research. 
The remainder of the questionnaire was based on 6 themes of cyber security 
awareness and cyber behaviour. The themes are as follows: 
a. Data Backup. This is important to ensure data can be restored if it 
is destroyed through natural calamities or stolen by hackers.  
b. Device Safety. Protecting personal devices and office computers 
from malicious users by keeping it safe using security features available 
and not sending sensitive information using public WiFi hotspots.  
c. Malware. Protection against malicious software using anti-virus 
and simple techniques such as keeping the computers and personal 
devices up to date.  
d. Phishing. Avoidance from phishing attacks by recognising signs 
of rogue emails and links. 
e. Passwords. Protection of personal and official data through use 
of secure passwords. 
f. Behaviour. Expected cyber behaviour to protect and prevent 
malicious attacks to personal and office devices and networks.  
The themes were extracted from the government infographics on cyber security 
practices for small sized businesses. The questions related to either personal, 
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or work use, and occasional combined use of information technologies by 
soldiers and officers from the R SIGNALS to ascertain all areas were captured. 
For each item, the target (personal, work, both) was explicitly stated in the 
questionnaire. The original question set for the survey had four type of Likert 
scales (as shown in Table 3) for the 6 themes of cyber security awareness and 
behaviour. Upon further consideration of data analytics this was reduced to just 
frequency and awareness (as shown in Table 4) (as it was highlighted that 
having a lot of Likert scales would introduce issues during data analysis phase). 
Table 3 - Initial Questions Design using 4 Likert Scale Types 










Theme 5 – 
Passwords 
Theme 6 - 
Behaviours 
Importance 1 1 2 1 1  
Frequency 2 3 3 2 3 3 
Awareness 1 3 3 2 1  
Agreement    1  3 
Total Items 4 7 8 6 5 6 
Table 4 -Question Design with 2 Likert Scale Types 










Theme 5 – 
Passwords 
Theme 6 - 
Behaviours 
Frequency 3 3 5 4 4 7 
Awareness 3 5 4 5 4   
Total Items 6 8 9 9 8 7 
Once the questions were designed with the two Likert scale response types, it 
was necessary that some questions required reverse coding to avoid ‘response 
sets’. Neuman (2014, p232) defines response set as “a tendency to agree with 
every question in a series rather than carefully thinking through one’s answer to 
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each”. One example of reverse coding was for the question ‘Do you leave your 
personal devices unattended when you are in public places’ with the response 
scale including never, rarely, sometimes, often and always. This question was 
reverse coded to ‘Do you have your personal devices attended when you are in 
public places’. By switching the polarity of the question, this would avoid 
response sets from participants.  
 In addition to this, the question randomisation feature in Qualtrics was utilised 
to randomise the presentation order of the two Likert scale type questions. This 
would mitigate against response sets and still output the data in the order the 
questions were entered into Qualtrics. It also helps spread the risk of any 
disengagement and fatigue towards the end of the participation being spread 
across the items presented rather than unduly degrading consideration of items 
at the end of a scale. The survey was open for 30 days to ensure enough time 
was available to collect data from the sample selected. 
3.2.5 Pilot Survey 
Once the online survey questionnaire was ready, it was deemed necessary to 
pilot the survey. Saunders et al. (2009) highlights the importance of the pilot in 
order to further improve the questionnaire so that respondents will have no 
issues answering the questions and there are no problems with recoding the 
data.  The piloting process did not check the validity and reliability of the data 
collected. Once the survey questionnaire was ready for pilot this was distributed 
to some work colleagues and to the project supervisor. The link to the Qualtrics 
Survey questionnaire was sent to the pilot team to check for suitability of 
questions, length of time to take the survey and provide feedback on the survey. 
It was also to ensure questions in the survey items were unambiguous and 
layout was clear and appealing for the participants. All the colleagues who were 
part of the pilot were military and due to their trade had basic knowledge of 
cyber security awareness and the practices although the pilot could have 
included people without cyber security background due to the simple nature of 
the questions in the survey. 
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Feedback from the pilot on the length of time to complete the survey was 
between 12 – 15 mins which was considered to be reasonable for the survey. 
There were no other comments made on the pilot by the author’s work 
colleagues who generally gave a good review about the questionnaire. The 
dissertation tutor advised reverse coding on few more questions. This was 
implemented by making changes to a number of questions in order to avoid 
bias in responses. 
3.2.6 Procedure 
The sample required for the survey was chosen from different R SIGNALS 
units. This included soldiers and officers from a number of Regiments by 
explicitly asking permission from their commanding officers to go ahead with the 
survey. A link to the survey was sent to the commanding officers stating the 
need and importance of the research and explaining the potential benefits of 
future cyber security training recommendations. Soldiers and officers of R 
SIGNALS were considered to be the right population to take part in the survey 
as they operate IT equipment daily and is business as usual. The exposure to 
the state of the art technology equipment and systems makes them vulnerable 
to cyber-attack from the adversaries.  Hence cyber security awareness is crucial 
in this organisation. Although, it was not possible to reach all the population in 
the R SIGNALS, best effort was used to reach out to maximum number of 
officers and soldiers to take part in the survey. The adjusted sample size 
calculated was 160, only 118 soldiers and officers took part in the survey before 
it was closed after 30 days. So, the response rate was approximately 73%. 
3.2.7 Ethics 
The ethical considerations and approach taken for this research is based on the 
Cranfield University Research Ethics System (CURES). Throughout this study, 
the research complied with the code of conduct set up by the CURES Ethics 
committee. The research was graded 2b and risks associated with it was 
classed as being low. Email confirmation with regards to CURES approval for 
the study is attached at Appendix C. 
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The study was designed with full consideration to ethics and protection and 
welfare of the research participants. The research was conducted with diligence 
and avoided causing any harm, discomfort and invasion of privacy of the 
participants. All those taking part in the data collection process had to provide 
an informed consent before proceeding with the survey and had the right to 
withdraw at any time. Personal details such as names, Army number, unit 
address were excluded from the research to maintain anonymity and 
confidentiality of participants’ details in the research outputs. The purpose and 
potential benefits of the study were also explained to the participants prior to 
partaking in the survey. All the data collected from this research will be treated 





4 RESULTS  
Introduction 
This chapter will provide results from the survey conducted using Qualtrics 
online survey software tool on cyber security awareness and behaviour of 
soldiers and officers from R SIGNALS. The first part of the questionnaire 
included a consent form for taking part in the survey followed by questions on 
demographics. The remaining part was to do with cyber security awareness and 
behaviour related questions. The results will be presented using graphs and 
tables and will include explanation of the data collected. The subsequent 
chapters will include detailed analysis and interpretation in conjunction with 




4.1 Quantitative Data Treatment 
In total 118 participants took part in the survey of which 14 participants had 
significant data missing hence they were ignored for the research analytics.  
Therefore, the actual sample size for the research was 104. The sample size of 
104 included 70 soldiers and 34 officers. The officers were further categorised 
into 18 DE officers and 16 LE officers. LE officers are those who commission 
from the ranks having spent a lot of years and experience in service. DE officers 
are those who join the military directly as an officer through Sandhurst selection 
and start from the rank of Second Lieutenant and tend to be young in age and 
inexperienced compared to LE officers.  
It was considered important to categorise the sample in terms of their trades. 
Although all the participants were from R SIGNALS and are professional 
communicators in the British Army, the difference in trade means that some are 
likely to be more cyber aware than others. For example, a soldier who is 
communication system engineer by trade would be more familiar with the 
technical and cyber security aspects of information systems and technologies 
than a communication systems operator who most of the time is trained in the 
operation of the equipment. Similarly, and in most cases LE officers are 
expected to have more experience and knowledge on cyber security than young 
DE officers. The next category was about cyber security training. From the 
results it was identified that 65.4% of respondents had cyber security training 
whereas the remainder 34.6% responded ‘no’ to the question. The question 
initially intended to capture the time scales of training but further inspection of 
the results meant that it was not statistically viable and therefore, responses 
were classed as a ‘yes’ or ‘no’. People who have had cyber training were 
expected to be more cyber aware than those who didn’t.  
Another category from the demographics was to do with level of education of 
the participants. One respondent detailed a MSc which was re-categorised to 
‘Postgraduate education’. Five ‘other’ responses were deleted as these were 
considered as not interpretable for the results. Some reverse scoring work had 
to be carried out for questions that were negatively worded to ensure 
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appropriate scoring. In total, there were 12 items that were reverse scored of 
which 11 were to do with frequency behaviours and one was to do with reported 
satisfaction with training.  
4.1.1 Cronbach’s Reliability of (Sub)Scales 
Cronbach’s alpha is a psychometric statistic that was introduced by Cronbach in 
1952. 
“Cronbach's alpha is a statistic that measures the internal 
consistency among a set of survey items that (a) a researcher 
believes all measure the same construct, (b) are therefore 
correlated with each other, and (c) thus could be formed into some 
type of scale. It belongs to a wide range of reliability measures” 
(Trobia, 2017, p2). 
 
The questionnaire uses two Likert type scales (awareness, frequency) and 
multiple items with the intention to measure cyber security awareness and 
frequency of behaviour of participants in the survey sample. Cronbach’s alpha 
helps measure the internal consistency i.e. reliability of the survey items. 
Equation 1 shows the formula for calculating Cronbach’s alpha where n 




  Equation 1 - Cronbach Alpha Formula (Trobia, 2017) 
 
Table 5 shows the reliability criteria for Cronbach’s alpha. 
Table 5 - Reliability Criteria using SPSS Software (SPSS, 2018) 
Cronbach's Alpha Internal Consistency 
α  ≥  0.9 Excellent 
0.9 > α ≥ 0.8 Good 
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0.8 > α ≥ 0.7 Acceptable 
0.7 > α ≥ 0.6 Questionable 
0.6 > α ≥ 0.5 Poor 
   
The survey participants data from Qualtrics was exported into Microsoft Excel 
and then imported in Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). This 
was to calculate the Cronbach’s alpha based on the themes for the question 
with the Likert scales used. Each theme included composite item made of 
several questions. The Cronbach’s alpha values calculated from SPSS for the 
two type of Likert scales and themes are included in Table 6. 







Malware Phishing Passwords Behaviours Total 
Frequency  α = .51 α = .40 α = -.13 α = -.53 α = .49 α = .51 α = 
.78 
Awareness α = .77 α = .87 α = .89 α = .83 α = .79 n/a n/a 
 
For the Frequency Likert scale, many of the themes did not reach an acceptable 
level of Cronbach’s alpha. According to Trobia (2017, p3), negative Cronbach’s 
alpha is statistically possible but meaningless in respects to interpretation and 
could be due to the orientation of items being scaled. This would mean poor 
correlation between items. However, the Cronbach’s alpha in totality for the 
whole frequency was 0.78 which is good according to the reliability criteria 
Table 5. 
For awareness Likert scale, all the composite items in the themes had a 
Cronbach alpha of 0.7 or more hence was considered reliable for the research.  
It meant that the results would be acceptable to consider reliable. 
4.2 Descriptive Results 
4.2.1 Sample Characteristics 
The next set of results included details on the sample characteristics. Figure 17 
illustrates the age group breakdown of officers and soldiers who took part in the 
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survey. It was necessary to capture the age group to investigate whether cyber 
security awareness has any relationship with age. Details on gender was also 
captured but as there were only 10% females and it was considered any 
observations made with regards to females would not be valid. 
 
   Figure 17 - Sample Age Group 
Figure 18 illustrates the breakdown of officer vs soldiers who took part in the 
survey. The data could later to utilised to highlight any difference in cyber 
security awareness between officers and soldiers. 
Out of 104 participants 70 were soldiers and 34 were officers. For soldiers and 
LE officers it can be assumed that with rank comes more experience and 
exposure to IT equipment hence will probably be more aware of cyber security 
risks and vulnerabilities. This would also apply to DE officers in some cases 
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Figure 18 - Sample Breakdown of Ranks 
Figure 19 shows the length of time-served in the R SIGNALS for the 
participants. The organisation’s role is to provide communication systems and 
networks to deployed forces whilst out on operations or for training support 
activities. The longer the time served, soldiers and officers are expected to be 
more experienced and knowledgeable with technologies that we hold in the 
corps, through training and operation of IT equipment. Participants who have 
served longer and have more experience with IT equipment are expected to 
have better cyber awareness. 
 
Figure 19 - Length of Time Served of Participants 
Figure 20 illustrates the trade breakdown for soldiers and officers. The trade 
defines what role soldiers and officers have for their daily business within R 
SIGNALS. After joining the R SIGNALS soldiers will go through their trade 
training. The length of time for trade training is different for a communication 
systems engineer and communication systems operator as the former training 
is much more technical and detailed than the latter. Soldiers and LE officers in 
trade are expected to have a much better understanding of technologies than 
DE officers who are on regimental duties in the R SIGNALS. It is expected that 
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Figure 20 - Trade Breakdown of Participants 
Figure 21 shows the breakdown of participants against Cyber Training. Only 36 
out of 104 had gone through some form of Cyber Training. The remainder 68 
reported they did not have any training. This can have an impact on the results 
of this survey as it can be expected that more participants will be less cyber 
aware and perform poorly when responding to the questionnaire. 
 
Figure 21 - Cyber Training Breakdown 
Figure 22 shows the level of education amongst participants. The figures 
illustrate that majority of the participants have a foundation degree or above 
which means that the sample selected are fairly educated. The level of 
education may have a correlation to the cyber awareness scale and how they 
behave in terms of becoming ‘cyber safe’ when operating computers and 
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 Figure 22 - Participants Education Level 
4.2.2 Pearson’s Correlation 
Table 7 shows the intercorrelation information and linear relationship between 
variables which was extracted using the SPSS software. The correlation 














Table 7 - Pearson's Intercorrelation 
  Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Age 
             
  
2 Gender .04 
            
  
3 Soldier/Officer .29** .19 
           
  
4 Rank range .50** .18 .91** 
          
  
5 Time in R SIGS .69** .07 .06 .33** 
         
  
6 Trade .24* .11 .73** .74** .05 
        
  
7 Cyber training .22* .10 .02 .08 .21* .06 
       
  
8 Education .35** .09 .42** .57** .24* .44** .20*               
9 FREQUENCY .19 -.02 .02 .60 .04 -.12 .27** .04 
     
  
10 Back-up behaviour (awareness) .19 -.12 -.02 .07 .08 -.19 .12 .12 .59** 
    
  
11 Device safety (awareness) .19 -.05 -.09 -.01 .15 -.30** .23* .12 .71** .78** 
   
  
12 Malware (awareness) .20* -.04 -.07 .03 .10 -.23* .18 .15 .70** .77** .85** 
  
  
13 Phishing (awareness) .23* -.09 -.08 .02 .14 -.28** .12 .04 .70** .79** .86** .82** 
 
  
14 Passwords (awareness) .17 -.06 -.01 .04 .05 -.16 .17 .08 .71** .78** .85** .84** .81**   
15 Training satisfaction .09 -.05 .10 .13 .14 .09 .24* -.03 .17 .27** .27** .21* .21* .21* 
 
* = significant at the p < .05 level 
** = significant at the p < .01 level 




There can be three types of outcome between two variables using Pearson’s ‘r’. 
A positive relationship is when a higher score on a variable will associate to a 
higher score on the second variable. A negative relationship is when a higher 
score on a variable has an inverse relationship on the second variable. The last 
type of relationship is when there is no discernable significant relationship 
between the variables. 
The Pearson’s intercorrelation table generated a significant number of results 
from the survey. All the significant results have been bolded in Table 7 to make 
them easier to be seen where relationships existed between variables. The 
ones highlighted are with the asterisk where * denotes correlation at p< 0.05 
level and ** denotes correlation at p<0.01 level. Whilst both indicate significant 
relationship (and rejects a null hypothesis between two variables is 
appropriate), those correlations at p<0.01 indicates significant result. All the 
variables related to the quantitative survey questions are listed vertically on the 
left.  The variables are repeated horizontally at the top but only with the number 
associated to the variable. Where the vertical variable meets the horizontal 
variable that is where the Pearson’s ‘r’ value is displayed. Variables 1 – 8 is 
related to the demographic information about the participants. Variable 9 
(Frequency) represents summed scale of respondents cyber behaviour in 
relation to cyber security awareness. Variables 10 -14 represents the summed 
scales of questions in the themes. Variable 15 represents the measurement for 
cyber security training amongst the participants. 
In the intercorrelation table, there is a great deal of ‘r’ values that are significant 
between variables. It would not be feasible to describe and analyse them all 
therefore only key relationship between variables will be discussed and 
analysed. It was observed that age has a positive relationship with time spent in 
the R SIGNALS, Cyber Training and Education which was expected. As age 
increases the time spent in R SIGNALS increases (r = 0.69, p <.01), cyber 
training increases (r = 0.22, p<.05) and education increases (r = 0.35, p<01). 
There is also correlation between Age and Malware (r = 0.20, p<.05) and 
Phishing awareness (r = 0.23, p<.05). There was correlation between rank 
 
65 
range and time spent in R SIGNALS and Education as expected. As soldiers 
and officers spend more time in the R SIGNALS rank increases (r = 0.33, 
p<.01) and education is expected to increase (r = 0.57, p<.01). As officers and 
soldiers spend more time in the Army, there is likelihood of increase in 
promotion and education opportunities. Time in R SIGNALS had a positive 
relationship with cyber training (r = 0.21, p<.05) and education (r = 0.24, p<.05).  
4.2.3 Research Question Specific Correlations 
It was observed that soldier/officer was unrelated to cyber awareness or cyber 
behaviours. Time in R SIGNALS was unrelated to all attitudes of interest 
(variable 9 – 15) and training satisfaction. However, trade was related to 
awareness about best practice for device safety (r = -.30, p<.01), malware (r = -
.23, p<.05) and Phishing (r = -.28, p<.01). 
Cyber training was related to education (r = .20, p<.05), reported frequency of 
cyber behaviour (r = .27, p<.01), awareness of device safety (r = .23, p<.05) 
and training satisfaction (r = .24,p<.05). Education was unexpectedly observed 
to be unrelated to all cyber attitudes of interest. 
Training satisfaction was related to reported cyber training (r = .24, p,.05), 
backup behaviour (r = .27, p<.01), device safety (r = .27, p<.01), malware (r = 
.21, p<.05), phishing (r = .21, p<.05) and passwords (r = .21, p<.05). The higher 
the awareness of cyber security best practice, the more satisfied are soldiers 
and officers with the level of training. It was unrelated to education level and 
self-reported frequency of cyber behaviours. 
4.3 Statistical Analysis  
4.3.1 Independent Sample t-test 
Independent samples t – tests were carried out on SPSS between Cyber 
Training and all attitudes with results shown in Table 8. The t -test calculates 
means of variables for two types of people who are either cyber trained or not 
trained against all attitudes.  
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Mean and Standard Deviations: 
Table 8 - Independent Test Results (Cyber Training Vs All attitudes) 







FREQUENCY 3.59 (.44) 3.84 (.36) t(102) = -2.90, p < .01 ** 
AWARE Back-up 3.92 (.89) 4.14 (.74) t(102) = -1.25, p = n.s. 
AWARE device safety 3.68 (.97) 4.12 (.80) t(102) = -2.33, p < .05 * 
AWARE malware 4.00 (.91) 4.32 (.69) t(102) = -1.82, p = n.s. 
AWARE phishing 3.73 (.90) 3.94 (.69) t(102) = -1.22, p = n.s. 
AWARE passwords 3.89 (.88) 4.19 (.73) t(102) = -1.74, p = n.s. 
Training satisfaction 2.87 (1.14) 3.47 (1.23) t(102) = -2.50, p < .05 * 
NB: n.s is not significant 
From the independent t-tests the following results were found to be significant. 
a. Frequency. This matches with the Pearson’s correlation test with the t-
test results as t(102) -2.90, p<.01**. As people are more cyber trained, their 
cyber behaviour frequency is also expected to improve. 
b. Awareness of Device Safety. The t-test result is t (102) = -2.33, p<.05*. 
Cyber Training would help increase awareness about device safety. 
c. Training Satisfaction. The t-test results is t (102) = -2.50,p<.05*. This is 
not surprising as training satisfaction can increase if people get cyber trained. 
4.3.2 One-Way Anova Test 
A One-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted to examine the 
impact of differing trades on cyber attitudes.  
4.3.2.1 Non-Significant Results 
There was no significant effect of Trade on the self-reported frequency of cyber 
behaviours (F(5, 103) = 1.88, MSE .18, p = n.s.). There was no significant effect 
on Trade on the awareness of best practice in backup behaviours (F(5, 103) = 
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3.24, MSE .63, p = n.s.). There was no significant effect of Trade on the 
awareness of best practice in Passwords (F(5, 103) = 2.01, MSE .66, p = n.s.). 
4.3.2.2 Significant Results 
There was a significant effect of Trade on the awareness of best practice in 
Device Safety (F(5, 103) = 5.54, MSE .70, p < .01 **). Follow up comparisons 
revealed that there was a significant difference between those describing their 
trade as ‘other’ and communications systems engineer (p<.01), supervisors 
(p<.01) and TOT or Tfc Offr (p<.01). There was also a significant effect of Trade 
on the awareness of best practice in phishing protection (F(5, 103) = 4.50, MSE 
.60, p < .01 **). Further comparisons revealed that there was a significant 
difference between those describing their trade as ‘other’ and communication 
systems engineer(p<.05), supervisors (p<.05) and TOT or Tfc Offr (p<.05). 
Those listing their trade as ‘other’ were as follows: 
 Commanding officer (n = 1) 
 Officer (n = 7) 
 DE Officer (n = 2) 
 Troop Commander (n = 3) 
 Squadron 2IC (n = 1) 
 Royal Signals electrician (n = 2) 
 Communication logistics specialist (n = 1) 
The trades and roles above are non-technical and in most cases, are job roles 
or trades where soldiers and officers do not get involved in the technical 
operation of IT equipment and therefore be unaware of phishing protection and 
device safety. For example, a Squadron 2IC is generally involved in the 
administration and disciplinary matters for soldiers. He would not be operating 
technical equipment on a day to day basis on his job role. 
One-way ANOVAs was also carried out on Education and all attitudes but there 
were no significant effects observed.  
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4.3.2.3 Further Observations 
One-Sample t-test was conducted on each of the awareness subcategories 
such that each sub-theme was compared to the overall mean awareness which 
was inclusive of all six sub-themes of awareness. Table 9 illustrates the results. 
Table 9 - One Sample t-test Results 
Measure Mean Standard 
deviation 
One sample t-test  
(against overall awareness average) 
1. Back-up 4.00 .84 n.s. 
2. Device safety 3.83 .93 n.s. 
3. Malware 4.12 .85 Significantly higher, p <.05 
4. Phishing 3.80 .83 Approaching significance, p = .72 
5. Passwords 3.99 .83 n.s. 
ALL AWARENESS 
MEASURES 
3.95 .79 n/a 
From the results it can be seen that Malware Mean 4.12 at p<.05 was found to 
be significantly higher compared to the other sub-themes whereas phishing was 
found to be approaching significance. 
4.4 Cyber Capability Maturity for R SIGNALS 
One of the objective for this thesis was to benchmark cyber capability maturity 
in the R SIGNALS and understand what level of maturity the organisation falls 
under in terms of cyber security awareness and behaviour. Capability maturity 
was inferred and calculated using participants’ scores from Qualtrics and 
through use of the maturity levels in Table 10 from the Community Cyber 
Capability Maturity Model developed by White (2011). Capability maturity 
categories were designated via quartile splits of the Likert scale scoring (1-5). 
From Qualtrics results, overall average for each item across the entire sample 
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was extracted. Given the Likert ratings used, the possible scores were between 
1 to 5 per individual, so across the entire sample, scores ranged between 1.00 
to 5.00 (2 decimal places). These were then divided into the 5 capability 
maturity levels (1 – 1.80 for Initial, 1.81 – 2.60 for Advanced, 2.61 – 3.40 for 
Self-Assessment, 3.41 – 4.20 for Integrated and 4.21 – 5.00 for Advanced). 
Based on the overall average score across all items, R SIGNALS was identified 
to fall on the ‘Integrated’ Level in the model. 
The table below indicates different levels of cyber maturity model and where R 
SIGNALS maturity placement is. 
Table 10 - Cyber Maturity Model Levels (White, 2011) 
Initial –  Average R SIGNALS score between 1-1.8, indicating no active 
management of this aspect of cyber security 
Advanced   
Self-Assessment 
Integrated – R SIGNALS overall average across all items 
Vanguard 
All the questionnaire items were split into 5 categories. The percentage 
breakdown of items falling into each category is illustrated in Figure 23 below: 
 






Initial Advanced Self-Assessment Integrated Vanguard
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5 DISCUSSION  
5.1 Introduction 
This research is an exploratory deductive study to understand cyber awareness 
and behaviour within the context of R SIGNALS. The organisation also known 
as ‘professional communicators’ hosts and operates a myriad of information 
systems that is connected to MOD proprietary networks. These networks and 
systems are protected by technological defences where possible from the public 
networks however it is crucial that users and operators of these systems 
understand the risks and vulnerabilities associated with connection to the 
cyberspace. The research adopts a quantitative method to investigate cyber 
awareness and behaviour amongst soldiers and officers in the R SIGNALS and 
benchmark user cyber security capability maturity state. This chapter will 
conduct a critical study and synthesise the results obtained from the quantitative 
study and will aim to answer the research aim and objectives. It will also include 
the findings from the literature review to address the research aim and 
objectives where appropriate.  
5.2 Research Questions and Objectives 
It is important to recap the research aim and objectives in this section to set the 
scene before looking at the in-depth analysis of the results from the data 
collection and literature review sections. There were two research questions 
with regards to this research. The first question “How can cyber awareness be 
measured? Can an explicit framework of cyber awareness be constructed to 
inform measurement of cyber awareness?” is addressed through an innovative 
online questionnaire that was devised using the government infographic for 
basic cyber security practices. Along with this, a literature review was 
conducted in this area to identify whether there are other frameworks to 
measure cyber security awareness and behaviour and what factors affect the 
behavioural aspect of cyber security awareness. Models like the HAIS 
framework (Parsons et al., 2017), risky behaviour scales (Ögütçü et al., 2016) 
and the KAB model (Kruger and Kearney, 2016) were found to be useful in 
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measuring security awareness and behaviour. The second question “Can 
measurements be used to form an assessment of cyber awareness capability 
maturity?” was addressed via reflection upon the  capability maturity models in 
use by industry and academia using literature review and application of a cyber 
capability maturity model to determine the maturity state of R SIGNALS. 
To address the research questions the study focussed on a number of 
objectives. These included researching for cyber security awareness and 
behavioural measurement frameworks and devising a refined technique to 
assess awareness and security behaviour of soldiers and officers in the R 
SIGNALS, a novel context. The next objective was to carry out a study of UK 
and Defence cyber security strategy and understand how it applies to the Army. 
A study was also to be carried on cyber behaviour and factors that are 
intrinsically linked to the cyber attitudes and intentions of a computer user. 
Another objective was to do with understanding cyber security awareness about 
protective practices and how best to deliver a cyber security awareness 
program. Finally, the last objective was to do with the study of capability 
maturity models and finding a suitable one to benchmark user cyber security 
awareness level in the R SIGNALS. Each of the objectives were designed to 
help address the two research questions in the thesis. 
5.2.1 Research Question 1 (RQ1) 
This Research Question has two parts; first one is to investigate whether 
measurements of cyber awareness is possible and if so, the second part is to 
investigate what methods that are out there used by industry and academia to 
measure cyber awareness. While effective cyber security policies exist cyber 
awareness campaigns are key in raising cyber security awareness in 
organisations as, it is important for organisations to ensure the knowledge of 
protective practices translates into appropriate cyber behaviour. 
5.2.1.1 Research Question 1 Findings 
How can cyber awareness be measured? 
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Cyber awareness is vital for organisations that employ information systems and 
networks and users must be aware of the risks and vulnerabilities posed by the 
cyberspace. Good cyber hygiene is extremely important to ensure employers do 
their part to avoid malicious users gaining illegal access and exploiting our 
networks, information systems and data within it. Cyber First AID (adaptable, 
integrated and deliberate) is a concept that Crannell et al. (2013) proposes to 
ensure good cyber hygiene is adopted. When carrying out the literature review it 
was identified that there have been extensive work carried out by academia in 
measuring ISA as opposed specifically to cyber security awareness. Although, 
the term ‘information security’ and ‘cyber security’ is similar in many respects. 
Neikerk and Solms (2013) argues that the two terms are not totally analogous 
however, the human awareness and behavioural piece remains similar. The 
components linked with security awareness for both cyber security and 
information security remains the same. In past research studies both 
information security and cyber security awareness measurements studies have 
included knowledge, attitude and behaviour as metrics to capture awareness. 
Kruger and Kearney (2006) uses these three components, although he refers to 
them as affect, behaviour and cognition when measuring ISA in a mining 
company. Parsons et al. (2017) uses knowledge, attitude and behaviour to 
measure cyber security awareness of university students and working 
population in Australia. Cyber security is not just about having the knowledge 
and being aware of organisational protective practices from cyber security 
policies, it is also about how much employees are willing to adopt the practices 
with safe computing behaviour. Therefore, it is important to understand what 
factors affect safe computing behaviour. Hence, in past research studies 
knowledge, attitude and behaviour are often used for cyber security awareness.  
There are different human psychological models that were researched for this 
study in order to investigate the factors that influences human to adopt safe 
computing behaviour and how closely attitude and behaviour are linked such as 
how attitudes influences behaviour.  
One model that was researched is the TPB developed by Ajzen and Fishbein 
(1980, cited in Arnold et al., 2005) and which was originally called the theory of 
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reasoned action. The model has been successfully used in the past to predict 
human behaviours (e.g., Arnold et al., 2005) and takes into account attitudes, 
subjective norms, perceived behavioural control and attitudes. To ensure 
employees exhibit correct cyber behaviour, it is important for employers to 
understand the factors which influences cyber attitudes. If these factors are 
addressed correctly then security awareness will be followed by safe and 
secure behaviour. The other model that is useful in influencing human 
behaviours is the ‘Technology Acceptance Model’ which highlights what factors 
affect the use of information systems (Arnold et al. 2005). The factors that affect 
attitudes and behaviours to use protective cyber measures include the 
perceived ease of use and the perceived usefulness of the protective measures. 
Employers need to understand and address these two aspects of IT adoption 
which should assist with employees following protective practices with the 
correct behaviour.  
To further investigate how cyber security awareness can be aptly measured 
within a Defence context, the author created a measurement framework to 
quantify cyber security awareness and behaviour. This framework adapted the 
NCSC (NCSC, 2017) cyber security infographic for cyber security for small 
businesses and created 6 themes (Device Backup, Device Safety, Malware, 
Phishing, Passwords, Behaviour), and devised a measurement questionnaire. 
The themes are considered by NCSC as the most common methods of 
exploiting cyberspace by cyber criminals. The survey was conducted using 
soldiers and officers from R SIGNALS to capture awareness of basic cyber 
protective practices and their behaviour. Two types of Likert scales was used to 
measure awareness and frequency of behaviour across all themes. When 
calculating internal consistencies using Cronbach’s alpha between items in the 
questionnaire, the frequency questions resulted with negative or poor alpha 
values. Further statistical analysis could have been conducted to investigate the 
low Cronbach’s alpha and making constructive changes to the questioning 
themes, however due to the nature of the research project (MSc research) and 
time constraints, this was not presently possible. 
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There were four hypothesis created for the survey in order to capture 
demographic factors that would influence cyber security awareness and 
behaviour in the R SIGNALS. The hypothesis are as follows: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1) – Due to educational differences, officers will be more cyber 
aware than soldiers. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2) – Soldiers and officers who have served longer in the R 
SIGNALS will have better cyber awareness and behaviour. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3) – Those who have undergone cyber security training will be 
more cyber aware with better behaviours. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4) – Those in technical trades in the R SIGNALS will be more 
cyber aware than others. 
 
Figure 24 - Hypothesis Testing for Cyber Awareness 
Figure 24 illustrates how the author predicted the four factors (education, time 
served, cyber training and trade) would affect cyber security awareness and 
behaviours in the R SIGNALS. Initially, gender was also considered as a 
determinant for the variance in cyber awareness but this was disregarded in the 
survey results as only 10% participants were female and the results would not 






Hypothesis 1 (H1) – Due to educational differences, officers will be more cyber 
aware than soldiers. 
Author’s Prediction: Most of the DE officers who join Sandhurst have 
university degrees. “Male and female cadets are trained together in 
integrated platoons and the majority come from state-funded education, with 
around 90% holding university degrees” (RMAS website, 2018. All TOT officers 
in R SIGNALS will have an undergraduate degree as they would have attended 
the Foreman of Signals (FofS) training as a soldier which would provide them 
with a Bachelor’s Degree in Telecommunications Systems Engineering. Tfc 
Offrs have to go through ‘Yeoman of Signals’ training as a soldier and would get 
a Bachelor’s degree in Communications Management (R SIGNALSb, 2018). All 
other LE officers who are on Regimental Duties role would also have the 
opportunity to gain academic qualifications through professional development 
throughout their career. 
To join the R SIGNALS as a soldier, GCSE grade A – C in at least English 
Language, Maths and an IT or science based subject is required. However, 
soldiers with better grades have more chance of getting selected in technical 
trades such as communication systems engineer and communications systems 
operator. Although soldiers are on technical trades, it is assumed that they 
would not have the required experience and maturity with IT capabilities hence 
cyber awareness was expected to be lower relative to officers. The literature 
review indicated similar expectations. Aloul, et al. (2012) in their survey, stated 
that participants with computer science degrees were less susceptible to 
phishing attack. Also, Sheng et al. (2010) conducted demographic analysis of 
phishing in which it was stated that younger participants had lower level of 
education hence was more susceptible to the attack. 
 Findings:  
Out of the sample selected for the survey, 70 were soldiers and 34 were officers 
(as shown in Figure 18, p.58). From Pearson’s intercorrelation, there was no 
significant association between officers and soldiers against cyber awareness 
 
77 
or cyber behaviour, as measured presently. The results therefore contradict 
findings from the literature review which indicated that users with better 
academic qualifications were less susceptible to cyber-attacks such as 
phishing. The disparity in results could be because majority of the soldiers (52 
in total) who took part in the survey had served between 11 – 22 years and 
would have the experience of working with IT equipment and also would have 
an undergraduate or a Foundation degree through their trade training. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2) – Soldiers and Officers who have served longer in the R 
SIGNALS will have better cyber awareness and behaviour. 
Author’s Prediction: The author expected cyber awareness and behaviour to 
improve as time served in the R SIGNALS increased for soldiers and officers. 
The reason why this was predicted was because soldiers and officers become 
more experienced in operating and managing information systems technology 
equipment and are expected to be more aware of ‘dos’ and ‘donts’ for cyber 
security as they spend more time in the R SIGNALS. On top of this, during the 
trade training soldiers on technical trades get taught on the risks and 
vulnerabilities of using information systems and networks. R SIGNALS is 
classed as a technical Corps due to the information services, infrastructure and 
networks that is provided to the customers when deployed on operations 
abroad or on other supporting activities at home in the UK. 
Findings: From Pearson’s intercorrelation, it was found that there was no 
significant association between time served in R SIGNALS and cyber 
awareness and behaviours, as measured currently. From the results it can be 
seen that cyber security awareness and behaviours is not dependent on time 
served in the military. This is a hypothesis that could be further examined in 
future research. Maybe training included during soldier’s trade training is 
sufficient and there is a skill-fade amongst those who have served for longer. 
Such users may require cyber security refresher training to polish their 
knowledge. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3) – Those who have undergone cyber security training will be 
more cyber aware with better behaviours.  
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Author’s Prediction: The author predicted that those who have attended cyber 
training would be more cyber security aware and more likely to exhibit safe 
computing behaviour. In the research Aloul et al. (2013) conducted, it was 
stated that those who had phishing training were less susceptible to a phishing 
attack compared to the ones who did not undergo the training. Siponen, 
Mahmood, Pahnila (2014) agrees that information security education and 
hands-on training enhances confidence in the employee’s ability to comply with 
security policies. However, it is important to select the correct method of training 
delivery as it needs to be simple, easy and an effective way of increasing user 
awareness of cyber security. 
Findings: Results from the survey indicated that only 36 out of 104 participants 
had some form of Cyber Training. This was unexpected for the author as there 
were more than 34 soldiers and officers who took part in the survey who were of 
technical trades. The Pearson’s intercorrelation supported this hypothesis and 
showed significant correlation between cyber training and reported frequency of 
cyber behaviour. However, out of the six themes only device safety had 
significant correlation with cyber training. Further to this, an independent sample 
t-test was conducted between cyber training and all attitudes. The results from 
this test showed significant relation between cyber training and frequency of 
reported behaviour. It also re-confirmed significant relationship between cyber 
training and awareness of device safety. This showed that soldiers and officers 
who are trained on cyber security have more likelihood of exhibiting good cyber 
behaviour and will have better awareness on device safety. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4) – Those in technical trades in the R SIGNALS will be more 
cyber aware than others. 
Author’s Prediction: There are six trades in the R SIGNALS, but not all trades 
are technical and related with the daily operation of information systems and 
technology used within the Corps. The two trades communications systems 
engineer and communications systems operator are highly technical in nature 
and comprises of training on information systems, networks and infrastructure. 
As engineers and operators progress on through their career they have an 
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option to train as supervisors; operators progress onto becoming ‘Yeoman of 
Signals’ and engineers progress onto becoming ‘Foreman of Signals’. Both 
YofS and FofS course includes a bachelor’s degree, and course content 
includes extensive training on information systems and security. Soldiers in 
these trades were expected to show increased awareness in cyber security and 
exhibit good cyber behaviour. 
Findings: The results from Pearson’s intercorrelation showed significant 
correlation between trade and awareness of device safety, malware awareness 
and phishing awareness. It was unexpected that there was no correlation 
between trade and frequency of reported cyber behaviours as the author 
expected that technical trades would have better awareness, and therefore 
subsequently, their cyber behaviour would be better. A one-way ANOVA test 
was conducted to examine the association between differing trades and cyber 
attitudes. The results confirmed that there was no significant effect of trade on 
self-reported frequency of cyber behaviours. The ANOVA tests also confirmed 
significant effects of trade on phishing, malware and device safety. Further 
observations indicated there was difference between those participants who 
had mentioned their trade as ‘other’ and communication systems engineer, 
supervisors (FofS and YofS) and TOT or Tfc Offr. This difference may be down 
to non-technical trades who listed their trade as ‘other’.  
The next section will now explore measurement frameworks that have been 
used in the past by industry and academia to address the second part of RQ1. 
Can an explicit framework of cyber awareness be constructed to inform 
measurement of cyber security awareness? 
Cyber security awareness is very important to avoid the weakest link (humans) 
(Wright, 2016) from getting exploited by adversaries so as to protect our IS and 
networks. However, research in suitable measurement frameworks are sparse 
(Ögütçü et al., 2016). and Ng et al. (2009, p815)) agrees that there are few 
theoretical grounded research publications focusing on factors associated with 
safe computing behaviour. The literature review researched a number of 
frameworks that has been used in the past by academics to measure cyber 
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security awareness or ISA. These models are generally based on measuring 
three aspects of ISA; knowledge, attitude and behaviour. Parsons et al. (2017) 
uses knowledge, attitude and behaviour to construct a framework called the 
HAIS model to investigate ISA and validates the measurements with 
populations of different demographics in Australia. The model uses 7 focus 
areas; password management, email use, internet use, social media use, 
mobile devices, information handling and incident reporting. Each of the focus 
areas then was divided into 3 sub-areas which was  then measured using 
knowledge, attitude and behaviour scales. Once the survey was conducted this 
was followed by a phishing experiment to validate the results from the 
questionnaire. The framework is used to prove that knowledge about safe 
computing behaviour helps improve user’s attitude towards cyber security and 
this in turn improves actions taken by users in  adopting protective practices for 
information security or cyber security.  
The second measurement framework researched was by Ögütçü et al. (2016) 
where both computer user behaviour and awareness is measured using four 
scales; Risky Behaviour Scale, Conservative Behaviour Scale, Exposure to 
Offence Scale and Risk Perception Scale. These scales are then used as 
metrics in a questionnaire to measure user computer security behaviour and 
awareness. Risky Behaviour Scale measures the degree of risk of user 
computing behaviour, Conservative Behaviour Scale measures how much wary 
users are when taking risks associated when using computers, exposure to 
offence scale measures how likely users are to cause a security incident and 
finally risk perception scale is to measure the awareness of safe security 
behaviour. The novelty of this research is that it does not use the commonly 
used knowledge, attitude and behaviour to investigate cyber security awareness 
and produces a framework that is unique but effective in terms of measuring 
cyber security awareness and behaviour. 
Egelman, Harbach and Peer (2016) uses a Security Behaviour Intentions Scale 
(SeBIS) to measure attitudes of computer users and chooses awareness, 
passwords, updating and securement as scales to predict user computing 
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behaviour. The authors claim that the tool is a valid measurement framework to 
capture user secure computing behaviour. Awareness is measured to predict 
how effective a computer user is in detecting phishing incidents. The password 
scale is used to measure how good users are in creating safe and secure 
passwords. The updating scale is used to measure how likely users are in 
applying software patches and finally the securement scale is used to detect 
how users select secret codes to lock their phones. 
Parsons et al. (2017) argues that information security measurement framework 
from other researchers are still at early stages of development to measure 
every aspects of information security and claims his HAIS questionnaire has 
been tested rigorously for validity and reliability. The HAIS questionnaire 
presents a holistic measurement of ISA incorporating all aspects of safe 
computing behaviour capturing knowledge, attitude and behaviour of computer 
users.  
The next section will discuss and analyse the results from the literature review 
and data collection for cyber security capability maturity models which forms 
Research Question 2. 
5.2.2 Research Question 2 (RQ2) 
Can measurements be used to form an assessment of cyber security 
awareness capability maturity? 
Research Question 2 required exploratory study of cyber security capability 
maturity models used by academics to assess maturity level in cyber security. 
The second part included data collected from the survey questionnaire to 
benchmark cyber security maturity level for R SIGNALS.  
The importance of cyber security awareness in R SIGNALS is ever increasing. 
Army 2020 Refine changes has meant that the organisation will be become 
more technical with more emphasis on improved skills for software engineering, 
data analytics, applications and cyber activities. The new changes will include 
two new cyber regiments entirely focused to produce cyber professionals and 
protecting the corps’ IS and networks. The new structure will also mean R 
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SIGNALS will be designed to deliver robust, resilient and secure networks of 
information services for the 21st Century (Gen Pope, 2018). To provide such a 
capability cyber security awareness will be essential to deter malicious users 
gaining access for exploiting MOD systems, networks and personnel. A cyber 
capability maturity model will help establish what maturity state R SIGNALS is 
currently at and what improvement is required in the field of cyber security to 
improve cyber security awareness and behaviour amongst computer users. 
As part of the literature review, a number of capability maturity models were 
researched to find a suitable model for benchmarking R SIGNAL’s cyber 
security capability maturity. As mentioned in the literature review, the word 
‘information security awareness’ and ‘cyber security awareness’ has been used 
interchangeably in this research as the awareness aspects of both fields are 
very similar. Capability maturity models were first developed for software 
development to improve and optimise their processes however with time, the 
models have evolved and have been modified by other government sectors and 
industries to improve their respective business processes. 
The first model that was researched was Curtis and Mehravari (2015) Cyber 
CMM used by the electricity sector and using three levels(Initiated, Performed 
and managed). This model was split into ten domains with key cyber security 
pratices to be completed to progress onto the next level in that domain. As this 
model was considered to be of a high level and designed for professional cyber 
practitioners it was considered unsuitable for assessing maturity for R 
SIGNALS. Another model explored was the Community Cyber Security Model 
which was developed by White (2011) and included five levels (Initial, 
Advanced, Self-Assessed, Integrated and Vanguard) of cyber security maturity. 
All levels used user awareness, information sharing, processes and procedures 
and integration as practices to determine the delineation of maturity levels. An 
organisation at the lowest level of maturity would have minimal cyber 
awareness amongst users, safe information sharing on cyber security would be 
minimal, established processes and procedures to follow after a cyber incident 
would be minimal and the ability to respond to a cyber incident would be close 
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to non-existent. The beauty of this model is that it can be used by organisation 
of any size and is simple to follow. The maturity levels from this model was used 
in conjunction with the results from the survey questionnaire to assess cyber 
security awareness and behaviour across R SIGNALS.  
Whilst this model seeks to overlay maturity across the organisational culture (to 
reflect overall responsibility and accountability as may be formalised through 
chain of command and leadership hierarchy) of an entire organisation, the 
author wanted the model to reflect awareness and behaviour across R 
SIGNALS at the level of individual users. All of the survey questionnaire items 
were intended to have respondent rate their own perceptions and capabilities 
rather than their perception of the capabilities and responsibilities within their 
workplace (e.g. leadership, cyber professional roles). As such the model was 
adapted to reflect this individual perspective across R SIGNALS.  
Only the security level labels from the community cyber security model was 
used to define R SIGNALS maturity state. Capability descriptors (the 
blurb/description below each title) from the Community Cyber Security model 
whilst useful was not deemed to be entirely appropriate for this research. Based 
on the overall average score across all items, R SIGNALS was identified to fall 
at the Integrated Level as shown in Table 11. 
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5.3 Research Generalisation 
This research has been successful in highlighting cyber security awareness and 
security complaint behaviour in R SIGNALS. The study has also been useful in 
assessing cyber security capability maturity state of R SIGNALS as an 
organisation. Generalisation is dependent on selecting the representative and 
correct quantity of sample population. Saunders etal. (2009, p217) states that 
the error in generalisation to a population gets lower as the sample population 
increases. 
The minimum sample size calculated for this research was 162, however the 
number of participants for the survey was 104 which was much lower than the 
designated minimum sample size. This would mean generalisation of the 
population based on the results from the sample selected would be erroneous. 
For quantitative research like the one conducted for this study, correct sample 
size which is representative of the population must be obtained to make any 
generalisation. If correct sample size would have been achieved then 
inferences could have been made about the entire population of R SIGNALS.  
Although cyber awareness and behaviour measurement framework developed 
for this study will come in useful for other corps and services, generalisation 
from the survey results for this study cannot be made for them with any 
confidence. In any case, this is not advisable as the population for other 
services and corps would have different cyber aptitude and their trades and 
roles within the military will be substantially different to R SIGNALS. 
5.4 Organisational Recommendations 
This research carried out an overall assessment of R SIGNALS soldiers and 
officers on cyber security awareness and behaviour. The study has been 
successful to draw out recommendations for improving cyber security 
awareness and improving computing behaviour. The research identifies a 
number of areas of cyber where improvement is crucial and have made 




5.4.1 Recommendations – Quick Wins 
5.4.1.1 Cyber Awareness, Attitude and Behaviour Measurement 
This research used a novel measurement framework devised by the author to 
measure cyber awareness and behaviour in the R SIGNALS. Although the 
framework requires refining and further validation, a similar measurement 
framework like the one from Parsons et al. (2017) which has been validated 
rigorously can be used to evaluate cyber awareness, attitude and behaviour in 
the R SIGNALS. The evaluation is necessary to baseline user awareness and 
their computing attitude and behaviour to inform future training on basic cyber 
protective practices. It may further serve to ascertain the convergent validity 
between the measurement framework generated in the present research and 
pre-exisiting measures that have already been validated. 
5.4.1.2 Cyber Training Delivery Methods 
The research highlighted that cyber security policies, awareness campaigns 
and training are measures organisations adopt to raise cyber security 
awareness and educate users to adopt safe computing behaviour. However, 
these measures are found to be inadequate if the training delivery methods are 
unsuitable for the population in R SIGNALS. Therefore, a detailed study on the 
population will be required, perhaps through a survey to indicate user 
preferences on training delivery methods. Training delivery incorporating a 
mixed approach like Abawajy and Kim (2010) suggests with methods 
incorporating text-based, game-based and video presentation might prove to be 
particularly advantageous. 
5.4.1.3 Cyber Awareness Training on Basic Protective Practices 
While the CPTs within the Army deals with the high level defensive and 
offensive cyber tactics to protect our systems and networks, basic user 
awareness is important to avoid social engineering attacks from cyber criminals. 
Training on basic cyber protective practices must be generic for everyone from 
the R SIGNALS. Less than 50% participants in the survey indicated that they 
had some form of cyber training which means there is a requirement to ensure 
training and refresher training is made mandatory for everyone in the R 
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SIGNALS. While comprehensive cyber training might be designed based on the 
results from this research project, for the short term, R SIGNALS employees 
can be directed to take the cyber awareness training on Defence Learning 
Environment (DLE) and this can be registered on their Joint Personal 
Administration (JPA) database as a competency to encourage training uptake. 
5.4.1.4 Research Identified Cyber Awareness and Behaviour Shortfall – 
Areas of Targeted Training 
The research looked at the relationship between cyber awareness and 
behaviour with factors such as academic qualification, time served, cyber 
training and trades using hypothesis testing. Targeted training can be delivered 
based on the results obtained from the survey. The survey results indicated that 
cyber training was related to all frequency reported behaviours but only related 
to device safety in awareness. This would mean more awareness training would 
be required to improve knowledge on malware, phishing, back-up and 
passwords. The testing of relationship between trades and cyber awareness 
implied that the technical trades were associated with the frequency of reported 
behaviours, as well as having awareness on device safety, malware and 
phishing. This indicated that targeted training would be required in other areas 
such as device backup and passwords. 
5.4.2 Recommendations – Medium Term 
5.4.2.1 Need for Army Cyber Strategy 
As highlighted in this report, the Army currently do not have a Cyber Strategy. 
The other two services , the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force have their own 
cyber strategies and provide detailed direction on cyber security for their 
individual services. There is a need for the Army to create a cyber strategy so 
that direction is provided to all the corps and organisations that fall within it. R 
SIGNALS can then create its own strategy document forging a basis and 
direction for an Army Cyber Strategy. 
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5.4.2.2 Capability Maturity Model Usage 
Maturity models are useful in assessing organisational cyber maturity state and 
identifying processes and procedures that require improving to protect our 
cyberspace and digitally connected networks, people and infrastructure. In this 
research, adoption of the community cyber security maturity model (White, 
2011) was used to benchmark cyber maturity in R SIGNALS. However, the 
adoption of the model was only limited to the participants rating their own 
perception and capabilities rather than providing a holistic view of their 
workplace culture. Future recommendations for use of maturity model should 
include assessment of maturity across organisational culture to reflect overall 
responsibility and accountability formalised through the chain of command (and 
formal professional roles). Capability measurement should then be conducted 
regularly to enable effective capability monitoring and to regularly identify areas 
for improvement. 
5.5 Methodological Evaluation 
The research adopted a cross-sectional study with quantitative data collection 
technique using an online survey questionnaire. This section will outline the 
methodological limitations and constraints. Also included will be an assessment 
of strengths and weaknesses of the methodology used for the research 
questions undertaken in the present research. 
5.5.1 Methodology Limitations and Constraints 
The inability to conduct longitudinal study for this research was due to time 
constraints hence a cross-sectional approach was adopted. Saunders et al. 
(2009) states that longitudinal studies have the capacity to track change and 
development whereas cross-sectional studies are only related to a particular 
time when the research takes place. Although, the research may have been 
improved using the longitudinal approach, the author did not have enough time 
or the resources to adopt it for this study. As the author is studying part-time to 




The sample completing the questionnaire was not numerically representative of 
the diverse population of R SIGNALS as the calculated sample size was not 
met (See Section 3.2.6). This may have been due to the length of time the 
survey was opened for which was not long enough to meet the minimum 
sample required. In addition to this, responses from 18 participants were 
excluded as part of data treatment as there was significant data missing. Hence 
generalisation cannot be confidently made about the entire R SIGNALS 
population with the results achieved with this study. The sample selected for 
soldiers was also not representative for ‘time served’ as most of respondents 
were between 11 – 22 years of service and there was very little representation 
from soldiers young in service. This meant that the validity of responses from 
the soldiers may be poor as only experienced soldiers were taking part in the 
survey. Similarly, the representation of females from the sample was not 
suitable, hence gender was disregarded from the survey. 
Once the survey was opened for the participants it was impossible to make 
changes to the questions if discrepancies were found as it may have nullified 
the use of previous respondents data. The pilot study was the only opportunity 
to find discrepancies with all aspects of the survey questionnaire. The results 
from Pearson’s coefficient test on reliability for frequency scale was negative or 
very low hence signifying poor reliability. This could have been further explored 
through statistical analysis and making changes to the grouping of question 
themes, however this could not be conducted within the present research 
timeframe.  
Another notable limitation is that quantitative surveys might often be prone to 
biased answers such as response sets. For this questionnaire, the possibility of 
response set was discouraged using the reverse-coding technique for 
questions. Nevertheless, it is possible that bias or inaccuracies in answer could 
still have been found due to several reasons, such as, the participants 
becoming bored of the questions and answering all the questions quickly 
without giving much thought. Another example maybe that the participant have 
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the habit of providing the same answers for questions that are similar. Hence, 
reverse coding of questions was used in order to avoid bias.  
A further critique of quantitative surveys such as this are that only one 
dimension is captured in terms of data collection. It cannot capture the 
subjective views of respondents that you would normally able to capture 
through an interview. Subjective views can be used to elaborate and confirm 
and/or contest the results obtained from quantitative methods. 
The survey was designed using an online software called Qualtrics. The online 
questionnaire meant that it was easier to distribute to participants irrespective of 
where they were located geographically. The compatibility of the questionnaire 
to be used in smart devices meant that users could take part in the survey using 
their phones while in the office or at their leisure. This was considered to be a 
strength of the research approach adopted presently. A challenge that the 
author encountered was the use of SPSS software to carry out data analysis. 
However, the dissertation supervisor provided the support required to use the 
SPSS software and with the data analysis. 
From the survey results there were some unexpected answers which could 
have been erroneous. For example when carrying out the Pearson’s 
intercorrelation, the technical trades had no relationship with frequency of 
reported behaviour. This was unexpected and could have been down to the 
poor reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) results for the frequency questions. 
Finally, although literature review is a complex process and full of challenges, it 
is a very useful method of studying work conducted by other researchers in your 
problem context. The main challenge included getting the keywords right when 
searching electronic databases and filtering materials by reviewing abstracts. 
When conducting a search in the online databases the results returned can 
sometimes be quite overwhelming and unmanageable. By having a good 
literature review strategy it was possible to coherently evaluate relevant 
literature that provided information for the problem that was being researched. 
This advanced the research agenda in a productive fashion. 
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5.6 Future Research 
This research has been useful in creating and validating an innovative cyber 
awareness and behaviour measurement framework in order to measure cyber 
security awareness and behaviour of soldiers and officers from R SIGNALS. 
However, like any research there is scope to take this research forward and 
improve the measurement framework, avoiding some of the methodological 
limitations as noted above whilst attempting to validate useful findings. A 
number of recommendations have been made below with regards to exploring 
and advancing the research areas further. 
5.6.1.1 Inclusion of Attitude Scale to the Measurement Framework 
The author developed an innovative framework for measuring basic cyber 
awareness and behaviour in this research.  The two scales for measurement 
was awareness and behaviour. After conducting the literature review, it was 
identified that attitude forms an important part for computer users adopting safe 
computing behaviour. Many researchers have used knowledge, attitude and 
behaviour as their scales for measuring security awareness. Parsons et al. 
(2017) uses knowledge, attitude and behaviour to measure ISA. The TPB 
explains how attitude, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control are 
factors which has direct influence on human intentions to behave in a particular 
way. It is important to understand what influences users to take the correct 
actions in terms of safe computing behaviour. The addition of the third scale 
‘attitude’ will make the security awareness measurement framework better by 
providing information about user’s perception to cyber security protective 
practices. 
When carrying out the awareness survey it is important to ensure the results are 
reliable and valid. This can perhaps be tested by a follow-up phishing 
experiment where the results of actual behaviour can be compared with the 
results from the survey (self-reported behaviour). If results from the phishing 
experiment correspond to that from the survey then this implies validity and 
reliability of the results obtained from the survey. 
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5.6.1.2 Better Sample Selection and Demographics Distribution 
The sampling technique used for this research was ‘probability sampling’. The 
intention was to make inferences with the results obtained from the 
representative sample to the R SIGNALS population. However, there were two 
issues with the samples. Firstly, the author was unsuccessful in meeting the 
minimal sample size requirement which was compounded by having to reject 18 
participants for incomplete data. Secondly, the distribution of samples were not 
uniform in terms of trades, time served, age, gender and rank. Hence, 
generalisation cannot be confidently made to the R SIGNALS population using 
the results from this research. Future research should include a quota sample of 
the demographic characteristics required for generalisation. The samples must 
be selected so that distribution of population variation in the samples are 
uniform which will increase the validity and reliability of the hypothesis test 
results. 
5.6.1.3 Questionnaire Pilot Study  
Once the questionnaire was designed and ready to be distributed, it had to be 
pilot tested before data collection. Saunders et al. (2009) recommends a 
minimum number of ten participants for small surveys and the sample selected 
should include major variation in the population that would impact the results. 
However, this study did not include enough participants for the pilot with the 
correct distribution of population variation due to time constraints. Further 
research must include the right sample selection for the pilot survey and results 
checked for reliability and validity before commencing with data collection. 
5.6.1.4 Mixed Approach Research Design 
This research exclusively used a quantitative method of data collection and 
analysis through the use of a survey questionnaire. A mixed method approach 
allows the use of both quantitative and qualitative techniques to address a 
research problem. Saunders et al. (2009) explains mixed approaches provides 
greater confidence in the results from a research. Quantitative methods alone 
do not include subjective views and observations of a research context and 
lacks greater understanding to a problem. Therefore, future research should 
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include a qualitative method which can be used to extend, validate, confirm or 
refute the results from the quantitative study. This would also allow greater 
validity of the results by triangulating data obtained from the mixed method 
approach and the literature review.  
5.6.1.5 Capability Maturity Models 
In this research the community cyber capability maturity model was adopted to 
benchmark cyber security maturity in the R SIGNALS.  However, the model was 
adopted in the most simplistic way and and it was used at the level of individual 
users. Future research on this study could include comprehensive use of the 
model by comparing the practices (user awareness, information sharing, 
processes and procedures and integration) at each level (e.g. team, company, 
chain of command) to further determine R SIGNALS placement within the 
correct capability maturity level. 
5.6.1.6 Longitudinal Study  
Further validation of the framework can be assessed using a Longitudinal 
approach to this research study. This approach will require time and resources 
to conduct it therefore will require someone who is undergoing an extended full 
time study. This study may present differing sets of results in terms of 
awareness and behaviour as cyber security awareness and processes evolves 
and matures in an organisation with time. 
5.7 Summary 
 
The research aimed to measure cyber security awareness and behaviour of 
officers and soldiers in the R SIGNALS using an innovative method that the 
author had created.  It also included benchmarking cyber capability maturity 
level for R SIGNALS using cyber capability maturity models. 
This chapter answered the research questions and objectives through the use 
of results from the literature review and data collected using an online 
questionnaire. The author makes recommendations for future research which 
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includes addition of the attitude scale to the measurement framework and 





6 CONCLUSION  
This chapter will highlight the conclusions drawn from this research and present 
a summary of findings for cyber security awareness and behaviour in R 
SIGNALS. The research strategy included a positivist approach with 
quantitative data collection technique. 
6.1 Research Outcomes 
6.1.1 Research Question 1 (RQ1) 
The first part of RQ1 was investigating how cyber awareness could be 
measured. To address this question, an innovative measurement framework in 
the form of an online questionnaire was created by the author to measure cyber 
awareness and behaviour of soldiers and officers from R SIGNALS. The 
questionnaire adapted basic cyber protective practices from the NCSC 
infographics on cyber security for small businesses and created six themes to 
test awareness and behaviour of the sample selected for the survey. A number 
of hypothesis was created to test them with the results obtained from the 
respondents. 
H1 – Due to educational differences officers will be more cyber aware than 
soldiers. 
The author predicted that the hypothesis would prove to be true but results from 
the survey concluded that educational differences between soldiers and officers 
did not have any influence on cyber awareness or behaviour in the R SIGNALS. 
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H2 – Soldiers and Officers who have served longer in the R SIGNALS will 
have better cyber awareness and behaviour. 
The author predicted that time served would have a positive effect on cyber 
awareness and behaviour. The findings from the survey concluded that time 
served in the R SIGNALS did not have any influence on cyber security 
awareness and behaviour. 
 
H3 – Those who have undergone cyber security training will be more 
cyber aware with better behaviours. 
The author predicted that soldiers and officers who attended cyber security 
training would have better cyber awareness and behaviour. Results from the 
survey concluded that cyber training showed significant correlations with 
reported frequency of behaviour and awareness on device safety. 
Recommendations made for targeted training on five other themes (malware, 
device backup, phishing and passwords). 
H4 – Those in technical trades in the R SIGNALS will be more cyber aware 
than others. 
The author predicted that technical trades (communication systems engineer, 
communciations systems operator, FofS, YofS, TOT and Tfc Offr) would have 
better cyber awareness and behaviours. Results from the survey showed 
correlation between technical trades and awareness of device safety, malware 
and phishing. There was no correlation between trades and reported frequency 
of behaviour. Recommendations were made for targeted training for technical 
trades on awareness of passwords and device backup. 
Further research using literature review identified that awareness is not enough 
in exhibiting safe computing behaviour. Behavioural models like the ‘Theory of 
Planned Behaviour’ (Arnold et al., 2005, Bulgurcu et al., 2010, Lebek et al., 
2014, Feielding et al., 2008 and Fang and Shih, 2018) was used in this 
research to identify factors that affect human attitudes that influences intentions 
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and behaviours. Another useful model researched is called the ‘Technology 
Acceptance Model’ (Arnold et al, 2005) where computer users look at perceived 
usefulness and ease of using the technology and behave accordingly. 
Application of these models to address human behavioural factors such as 
attitude can influence how users adopt safe computing behaviour. 
The second part of RQ 1 was investigating awareness measurement framework 
used by academics in past research. From the literature review, a number of 
measurement frameworks were identified for measuring cyber awareness and 
behaviour. The first one investigated was of Parsons et al. (2017) which uses 
knowledge, attitude and behaviour to test security awareness. The framework 
has been tested multiple times for validity and reliability. Another framework that 
was researched was the one developed by Ögütçü et al. (2016) which uses four 
scales for user awareness; Risky Behaviour Scale, Conservative Behaviour 
Scale, Exposure to Offence Scale and Risk Perception Scale. The author feels 
that the novelty of this research is that it is unique and effective way to measure 
user security awareness and behaviour appropriate for the Defence (R 
SIGNALS) context. 
Furthermore, the literature review highlighted that selection of training delivery 
methods for awareness and safe computing behaviour is absolutely vital to 
improve organisational cyber security awareness and behaviour. Choosing the 
right delivery method would ensure that knowledge is translated into awareness 
and awareness and intentions translated into safe and secure behaviour. A 
mixed approach was found to be the most effective using text-based, game-
based and video presentation based training methods (Abawajy and Kim, 2010, 
Saunders et al., 2009). 
6.1.2 Research Question 2 (RQ 2) 
An exploratory study of cyber security capability maturity models was conducted 
during the literature review to assess maturity levels of organisations in cyber 
security.  A number of maturity models were considered for the research (Curtis 
and Mehravari, 2015, Barclay, 2014, White, 2011). The first two were 
disregarded for this research as it was considered too high level for 
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benchmarking cyber capability maturity for R SIGNALS. The Community 
Cybersecurity Maturity Model which uses five levels for maturity was adopted in 
the most simplistic way to benchmark cyber maturity in R SIGNALS. Using the 
results from the questionnaire, and based on user cyber security awareness  R 
SIGNALS was placed at the Integrated Level of maturity (Level 4). 
Key recommendations for future research include addition of an ‘attitude scale’ 
to the measurement framework devised by the author to have a holistic 
understanding of cyber awareness and behaviours for soldiers and officers in 
the R SIGNALS. The exisiting HAIS framework (Parsons et al, 2017) which has 
been proved for validity and reliability can be used to measure users’ attitude, 
however future researchers will benefit from conducting a review of 
development of the attitude scale between this research and the next one. A 
further recommendation of note included the comprehensive use of the 
Community Cybersecurity Model for R SIGNALS to include aspects of cyber 
culture within the Corps. 
This section has covered in summary whether the study answered the research 
questions and highlighted recommendations that have been made in the 
previous chapter. The following will cover literature considerations and final 
thoughts for the research. 
6.1.3 Literature Consideration 
 
The relation between the results from the literature review was at times both 
convergent and divergent with the results returned from the survey. The 
literature review indicated that users with better academic qualifications would 
be more cyber aware but results returned from the survey diverged, and failed 
to support this theory. On the other hand, both the measurement frameworks 
identified from the literature review and the one devised by the author was 
similar in terms of measurement of cyber security awareness, indicative of 
convergence. To further confirm convergence, future research could incorporate 
all of the scales, i.e. knowledge, attitude and behaviours. The three scales may 
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provide a holistic view of user awareness and behaviour in adopting basic cyber 
security protective practices. 
6.1.4 Final Thoughts 
 
With the structural changes dictated by A2020 Refine (Gen Pope, 2018), R 
SIGNALS remains to be a technical corps but will require a greater range of 
technical skills that includes expertise or basic protective skills in the ‘cyber’ 
arena. Until now, there is no cyber awareness framework that has been used by 
the Army to assess cyber awareness and behaviour. The novel measurement 
framework devised by the author in assessing cyber security awareness and 
behaviour can help identify and recommend aspects of cyber training for 
organisations. The framework once refined with the addition of an ‘attitude’ 
scale will quantify a holistic measurement of cyber security awareness and 
behaviour in an organisation. This could potentially be used as a generic 
framework for measurement within other corps and organisations in the Army. 
The results from the measurement framework can then be transposed into a 
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Appendix B – Survey Questionnaire 
 
Title of the Project: A study of the cyber security awareness and use of 
protective cyber security practices in defence settings.  
Research team: Sundar Sherchan, Victoria Smy 
Contact Details:  sundar.sherchan@cranfield.ac.uk, v.smy@cranfield.ac.uk 
Aims and objectives: 
This research that you have been invited to participate in examines key themes 
aligned to cyber security. More specifically, the research will examine your 
impressions of cyber security practice when working with computers within your 
typical work duties or at home. Your responses will be helpful in generating an 
overview of cyber practice and make recommendations to future training 
requirements. As such (and should you consent to provide your views), you are 
encouraged to answer questions as honestly as possible. 
 
1. I understand that this research is being undertaken with a view to 
completion of an MSc.  
 
2. I confirm that I have been informed about the aim and objectives of this 
research project and have voluntarily agreed to give my inputs. 
 
3. I understand that my responses are recorded anonymously and I will not 
be identifiable in any of the research outputs. 
 
4. I understand that the data collected will be kept in a secure location and 
used for the purposes of the project outlined. 
  
5. I understand that my raw data will be accessible only to the Cranfield 




6. I understand that no commercially sensitive or classified data will be 
collected, and that all written research outputs will be sanitised 
appropriately  
 
7. I understand that I am free to withdraw at any point by simply closing the 
web browser. 
Should you consent to take part in this research, please continue onto the 
questions that follow. 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
The next set of questions will be based on the demographics of the 
participants taking the survey. 
1. Which age group do you fall under? 
Under 20 
20 -29 
30 – 39 
40 -49 
50 -59 
2. What is your gender? 
 Male 
 Female 
3. Are you a soldier or an officer? 
 Soldier 
 Officer direct entry 
Officer late entry 




 Signaller – Corporal 
 Sergeant – Staff Sergeant 
 Warrant Officer Class 2 – Warrant Officer Class 1 
 Second Lieutenant – Lieutenant 
Captain - Major  
Lieutenant Colonel and above  






23 years and above 
6. What is your trade? 
 Communications System Engineer 
 Communications Systems Operator 
 Supervisor 
TOT or Traffic 
Regimental Duties 





7. Have you taken part in any cyber security training? If so, how recently did 
you attend this training? 
n/a – no cyber security training 
In the past 12 months 
In the past 2 years 
Longer than 2 years ago 
 







Other, please describe [   ] 
The questions that follow tap into a number of cyber security practices and 
behaviours. These relate to both your work role and your personal (home, 
public) use of information technologies, unless otherwise stipulated. Please pick 
the response that most closely matches your thoughts and practices. 
Likert FREQUENCY (F) scales 
NEVER (1) RARELY (2) SOMETIMES 
(3) 










Q10 1 How often do you carry out data 






Q11 2 Do you utilise cloud storage facilities to 











Q13 4 Do you switch on pin, password 
protection or fingerprint recognition on 




Q14 5 Do you keep your devices (and all 
installed apps) up to date, using the 
‘automatically update’ option if 
available? (Applicable to your personal 




Q15 6 Do you connect to Wi-Fi Hotspots when 






Q16 7 Do you impose strict access rules for 
the use of removable media devices 





Q17 8 How often do you send work/personal 





Q18 9 Do you use anti-virus software on all the Malware MalD_F3 
 
120 
computers and laptops that you use?  Defences 
(3) 
Q19 10 Do you download third party apps from 








Q20 11 How often do you check your protective 





Q21 12 How frequently do you scan your 
systems for security breaches such as 






Q22 13 Have you ever clicked on a potentially 
fraudulent website or link asking for 







Q23 14 How often do you check your emails for 
signs of phishing? Signs could be poor 






Q24 15 Do you report to your chain of 
command if you get an email asking for 





Q25 16 Do you use two factor authentication 
methods when logging into a website 
containing sensitive data such as your 




Q26 17 Do you change the manufacturer’s 






issued with? (Applicable to your 
personal life) 
Q27 18 How often do you use predictable 







Q28 19 How frequently do you keep some note 





















Q31 22 Do you open email attachments from 








Q32 23 Do you send sensitive information 
without checking that the ‘https’ prefix is 







Q33 24 Do you report poor security behaviour 






Q34 25 If you found a USB stick in public place, 







Q35 26 Do you ever leave your personal Cyber Cyb_F7_P 
 
122 
devices unattended when you are in 






Q36 27 How often do you send work/personal 








Likert AWARENESS (A) scales 
NEVER (1) RARELY (2) SOMETIMES 
(3) 




Question Theme CODE 
Q37 1 Are you aware of the importance of 





Q38 2 Are you aware that devices containing 
your backup data should not be 
permanently connected to the device 
holding the original copy neither 





Q39 3 Are you aware that cloud storage 
facilities allow you to access your data 





Q40 4 Are you aware that mobile devices can 
be configured to be tracked, remotely 







Q41 5 Were you aware that VPN and 3G or 
4G Connections are more secure than 





Q42 6 Are you aware that people with 
malicious intent may use shoulder 





Q43 7 Were you aware that personal devices 
such as smartphones and tablets used 
outside of the safety of home or office 
require more protection than ‘desktop’ 





Q44 8 Do you know it is important to replace 
devices that are no longer supported by 
manufacturers with more up-to-date 





Q45 9 Are you aware it is important to protect 
your computer systems against 






Q46 10 Are you aware that use of non-
approved software on tablets and 
smartphones could be harmful for your 
devices and may increase the risk of 







Q47 11 Are you aware that patches for 
software and firmware should be 
promptly applied with latest software 
updates provided by manufacturers and 
vendors using the ‘automatically 





Q48 12 Were you aware that most operating 
systems come with firewall which can 
be used as protection between your 





Q49 13 Are you aware of how to report 
suspected security breaches at work? 




Q50 14 Are you aware you must change your 
password as soon as you suspect a 





Q51 15 Are you aware that phishing attacks are 
often conducted using fake emails and 
through links to redundant websites 





Q52 16 Did you know that you can reduce the 
impact of phishing attacks by reducing 
personal use of work computers? 




Q53 17 Are you aware you should report 
malware attack if you suspect a 






Q54 18 Are you aware that all laptops, MACs 
and PCs can use encryption products 




Q55 19 Are you aware you should switch on 
your password, PIN protection or 
fingerprint recognition for mobile 





Q56 20 Are you aware you should report to 
your IT department if your password is 
stolen or you suspect someone knows 




Q57 21 Are you aware you can use a 
‘password manager’ to store passwords 
for your less important websites and 





Q58 22 Are you aware of any negative 
consequences of reporting security 









59. Do you perceive there to be any barriers to implementing cyber security 
practices within your job role? If so, please describe below. 
60. Are you satisfied with the level of cyber security training you have received? 
Satisfied 
Somewhat satisfied 





61. What additional training, resources or support would you like to have access 
to?  





Thank you very much for your time participating in this project. As mentioned 
earlier the data provided by you will be recorded anonymously. 
  
Should you have any concerns or queries, please feel free to contact the 
















Appendix D – R SIGNALS Placement in Community Cyber Capability Maturity Model 



































































3 - Do you regularly test restoration of your backup data?  
8 - How often do you send work/personal files using cloud storage? 
23 - Do you send sensitive information without checking that the ‘https’ prefix is present in the URL (web address)? 





































































1 - How often do you carry out data backups for your work/personal files? 
2 – Do you utilise cloud storage facilities to back up your work/personal files? 
7 - Do you impose strict access rules for the use of removable media devices such as USB sticks and SD cards? 
11 - How often do you check your protective firewalls are up-to-date? 
12 - How frequently do you scan your systems for security breaches such as malware attacks? (Applicable to your personal 
life) 
15 - Do you report to your chain of command if you get an email asking for personal or financial information? 
21 - Do you voluntarily change your password regularly? 
27 - How often do you send work/personal files using email? 
AWARENESS ITEMS: 
































































5 - Do you keep your devices (and all installed apps) up to date, using the ‘automatically update’ option if available? 
(Applicable to your personal life outside of work) 
14 - How often do you check your emails for signs of phishing? Signs could be poor spelling and grammar, low quality 
logos etc. 
18 - How often do you use predictable passwords (such as family and pet names)? 
23 - Do you send sensitive information without checking that the ‘https’ prefix is present in the URL (web address)? 1 - Are 
you aware of the importance of data backup?   
AWARENESS ITEMS: 
2 - Are you aware that devices containing your backup data should not be permanently connected to the device holding the original copy 
neither physically nor over a local network? 
4 - Are you aware that mobile devices can be configured to be tracked, remotely wiped or remotely locked when lost or stolen? 
5 - Were you aware that VPN and 3G or 4G Connections are more secure than WiFi hotspots when sending sensitive data? 
6 - Are you aware that people with malicious intent may use shoulder surfing techniques to steal information from you? 
7 - Were you aware that personal devices such as smartphones and tablets used outside of the safety of home or office require more 
protection than ‘desktop’ equipment? (Applicable to your personal life) 
8 - Do you know it is important to replace devices that are no longer supported by manufacturers with more up-to-date alternatives? 
(Applicable to your personal life) 
10 - Are you aware that use of non-approved software on tablets and smartphones could be harmful for your devices and may increase 
the risk of attack from malwares? 
11 - Are you aware that patches for software and firmware should be promptly applied with latest software updates provided by 
manufacturers and vendors using the ‘automatically update’ option where available? 
12 - Were you aware that most operating systems come with firewall which can be used as protection between your network and public 
networks? 
13 - Are you aware of how to report suspected security breaches at work? 
15 - Are you aware that phishing attacks are often conducted using fake emails and through links to redundant websites and carried out 
by asking for sensitive information? 
16 - Did you know that you can reduce the impact of phishing attacks by reducing personal use of work computers? (Applicable to work) 
17 - Are you aware you should report malware attack if you suspect a successful attack has taken place? 
18 - Are you aware that all laptops, MACs and PCs can use encryption products that require a password to load up?  
21 - Are you aware you can use a ‘password manager’ to store passwords for your less important websites and accounts? 
(Applicable to your personal life 
20 - Are you aware you should report to your IT department if your password is stolen or you suspect someone knows it? 






R SIGNALS average 
score between  
4.21-5 
 
N = 15 items 
FREQUENCY ITEMS: 
4 -Do you switch on pin, password protection or fingerprint recognition on your mobile devices? 
6 - Do you connect to Wi-Fi Hotspots when you need to send sensitive data? 
9 - Do you use anti-virus software on all the computers and laptops that you use? 
10 - Do you download third party apps from unknown sources? (Applicable to your personal life) 
13 - Have you ever clicked on a potentially fraudulent website or link asking for your personal/financial information? 
16 - Do you use two factor authentication methods when logging into a website containing sensitive data such as your bank 
accounts and work emails? 
17 - Do you change the manufacturer’s default passwords that your devices are issued with? (Applicable to your personal 
life) 19 - How frequently do you keep some note of your passwords near to your devices? 
20 - Do you share your password with others?  
22 - Do you open email attachments from unknown sources without checking for viruses? 
25 - If you found a USB stick in public place, would you plug into your computer? 
26 - Do you ever leave your personal devices unattended when you are in public places? (Applicable to your personal life) 
AWARENESS ITEMS: 
3 - Are you aware that cloud storage facilities allow you to access your data quickly from anywhere? 
9 - Are you aware it is important to protect your computer systems against malware (malicious software including viruses)? 
14 - Are you aware you must change your password as soon as you suspect a successful phishing attack has taken place? 
19 - Are you aware you should switch on your password, PIN protection or fingerprint recognition for mobile devices? 
(Applicable to your personal life) 
 
